Dodge the "bad guy"...again (Part 2)

[Robert Braun]

(..continued!)

Second, there is no direct evidence that Dodge actually trespassed on non-government, or native land. Dodge biographer William Salter explained that in 1827, Dodge negotiated his own terms for lead digging with a minor Winnebago chief named Bear-- a fact that Dr. Murphy does not dispute. Dodge remunerated the Winnebago with quantities of goods and supplies, a fact verified by the correspondence of U. S. Indian sub-agent John Marsh in a letter dated February 7, 1828. A close reading of Salter’s investigation reveals that the other Winnebago in the region had a change of heart and wanted Dodge and his sub-leased diggers and employees out of the region. The U. S. Government reasoned that, in order to avaoid a conflict, Dodge was not where he should be and should therefore move. Dodge countered that the boundaries and demarcations between government and native lands were less than clear, if defined at all. Further, one may infer that the U. S. Government had little sway on what Dodge did at all, since he cut his own deal with the Winnebago. Other emigrants to the lead lands cut similar deals: the Gratiots, and certainly the likes of Ebenezer Brigham and William Parrish. Brigham and Parrish, like others, penetrated deeper into the region than did Dodge, himself a relative “late-comer” in the 1827 emigrant boom.

The U. S. Government decided, rightly or wrongly, to make and example of Dodge. Dodge, secure in his belief of his consummated deal with the Winnebago, refused to budge unless the Government or the Winnebago could mount a larger force than he. There were not enough soldiers available at Fort Crawford to mount a larger force than Dodge, and the government backed down. In so doing, Dodge preserved his right to continue with his individual claim with the Winnebago.

Dr. Murphy did not explore the incursions of those emigrants that went much further north than Dodge to secure their claims in the lead region, and the quality of the deals (if any) they made with native people. She did not explain to readers that Dodge, as a late-comer to the region, probably followed, rather than lead, the (by then) widespread practice of cutting individual deals for mineral rights with native peoples in exchange for trade goods and supplies. And she did not prove her thesis that Dodge flagrantly violated Indian land rights.

Dr. Murphy’s shallow examination of Henry Dodge--his past, his motivations, and his enormous influence on the region-- mars an otherwise reasonable examination into the changeable and highly complex doings in the Upper Mississippi lead region from the 1790s-1832.

Now, if she could also get past her constant use of the burdensome and even insulting use of "politically correct" academic terminology for ethnic peoples, she'd have a really interesting essay!

[Peter Shrake]

Bob,

I believe you are right in some of your assertions on Dodge and wrong on others. Was Dodge the only person to challenge federal authority and move into HoChunk territory, no, clearly he was not. Was he an evil monster out to get the Indians, no he was not. Is he a favorite scapegoat yes, I think this is the case mainly because he figures so prominently in Wisconsin History. Was there a vague, and difficult to understand boundary line between the HoChunk and the miners, absolutely. But I still think he was out of line. I also think he was on HoChunk Territory and I also think he did not have the right to treat with the tribe on an independent basis.

The boundary line in question was established in 1825 at the Treaty of Prairie du Chien. At the council that established the boundary lines, the treaty commissioners, Lewis Cass and William Clark had such a difficult time establishing the boundary lines between the respective tribes in council, that they ultimately told the tribes to figure out the lines themselves. In the case of the lead region, this was really a dismal failure on their part because the HoChunk on one side, and the collective band of Pottawatomie, Chippewa, and Ottawa created a boundary line that maybe only they understood. It is even at that debatable if the HoChunk clearly new where their lands ended and the collected tribes along the Mississippi began. This point was of course extremely important because the miners operated on the lands owned by the Pottawatomie, Chippewa, and Ottawa. Immediately there were problems of miners operating on HoChunk lands. Or at least what the Hochunk perceived to be their lands.

The problem here, however is that I think Dodges, diggings were far enough inland to be clearly into HoChunk territory. The fact that he negotiated with the HoChunk and not the collective band along the Mississippi indicates that he probably knew that he was on HoChunk Land.

In terms of his actual negotiations, he was again in violation of federal authority. Only the federal government can negotiate with the tribes. This policy was established by the constitution and established as accepted federal policy there after. The whole reason for the policy was to prevent individual states or persons from creating separate deals that were contrary to the general policy or efforts of the federal government. Simply put Dodge did not have the legal authority to deal with the HoChunk. Now, I know that regardless of legalities, his deal did take place and that other deals between the Indians and other miners were established as well. This still does not make their actions legal. The statements of Indian Agents Street and Forsyth attest to the fact the federal representatives did not approve of his actions. The fact that the army was too weak to remove him also does not validate his operations. If one used that philosophy in light of today’s issues, that could make it legal and right for aliens to cross the boarder and live in the U.S. simply because there is not enough federal agents to monitor the entire U.S. boarder.

However, I still agree with you that there is too much criticism on Dodge. Was he out of line concerning his operations in the lead region, yes but it should also be considered that Dodge was a opportunist and an entrepaneur who knew that there were rich lead deposits in Wisconsin and wanted to be among the first to get at the gray gold. He was not alone in this.

The problem with Dodge was his timing. His move into HoChunk territory came right on the heels of the Red Bird affair and at a time when emotions still ran high along the frontier. The problems with the HoChunk were not resolved with the surrender of Red Bird but merely remained on a holding pattern until the summer of 1828 when a treaty was signed at Green Bay allowing miners to legally take their operations onto HoChunk Territory. The U.S. Commissioners tried to buy the lead lands in ‘28 but tribal leaders successfully stalled negotiations until the summer of 1829 when they finally gave in and sold the majority of the lead region to the federal government. In the end, what Dodge did was sense an opportunity. He knew that the boundary lines were vague, he knew that the federal authority was weak. He also knew that the HoChunk were still vulnerable from the incidents of the Red Bird incident. So he went deep into HoChunk territory to mine lead. He pushed the envelope and was successful. However, he did buck federal authority and his actions took place at a time when things could have gone quite badly. There was no guarantee that the HoChunk would not resume hostilities in 1828. In fact there was every reason to assume that the would. Dodge, and other miners who stepped into HoChunk territory risked a general Indian war with their actions. And that is where he should be criticized.

[Robert Braun]

Very interesting points here.

Now, Pete, I need to pick your brain further. If only the federal government can negotiate with Indians, how did the big fur companies operate with and among the native peoples? Were they and their agents able to deal directly with tribes and tribal sub-units? Traverse across their country trading furs for goods and supplies (conceding the non-permenant nature of this travel--i.e. they weren't necessarily erecting blockhouses and settlements.) If so, what was their legal authority to do so?

And... memory seems to recall that debts owed by Indians were sometimes negotiated into land treaty deals-- in other words, if Indian people owed traders for goods and supplies, the price of these goods were sometimes subtracted, or otherwise accounted for, in the purchase or annuity arrangement. This appears on its face to be federal consideration of private enterprise, and debts owed to private enterprise, in treaty-making.

[Marge Smith]

The Indian Traders were licensed by the government.
Prior to 1820 (not sure of date) they bought their Indian goods from the government, i.e. Prairie du Chien. The feds then discontinued the factory system with many of the Indian Traders owing for goods. For instance Thomas Forsythe is dunning A.P. VanMatre for his debt to the government. They decide on arbitration to be held at St. Louis which I don't think happened.
The licenses to the traders give the tribe, where the trader is to be stationed, bondsman or securities, etc.

[Peter Shrake]

It was good to see you last weekend Bob.

Betsymaid raises an important point, In order to trade with the tribes you had to receive licenses from federal Indian Agents. The official correspondence of Agents through out the area often mentions such activity. It seems to have been quite a common almost daily at times part of their duties. This situation did not only extend to the fur trade. Samuel Stambaugh in his brief tenure as agent at Green Bay had processed several applications for local merchants to build saw mill operations on the northern Wisconsin River, near what is now Wausau and Stevens Point.

It was the overall duty of the Indian Agent not only to act as an on site diplomat of sorts with the tribes but also to coordinate with the army in controlling all intercourse with the Indians. One of the major problems they were trying to curb was the flow of whiskey into the Indian Territories. Whiskey was the cause of many problems with the tribes and the government was constantly changing policy on the issue. This in itself raises the issue of the weakness of Federal authority on the Frontier. The U.S. used whiskey for its own purposes whenever it conducted negotiations with the tribes. This kind of inconsistency on the part of the Federal Government was not lost on those who lived and worked on the frontier.

Another reason for the strict federal control over Indian affairs was national security. Many if not all of the tribes in the Great Lakes region (in fact almost all of the tribes along the American Frontier) has sided with and fought for the British in the War of 1812. After the war the British maintained a presence on the north side of the Great Lakes and continued their relationships with the tribes. This included the trade of furs as well as their loyalty. Agents on the Frontier were always trying to wrench the tribes from the influence of the British. Through licensing, an agent could have a good idea who was going into Indian Territory.

I would agree with your observation that there was federal consideration of private enterprise. In fact I would argue that there was a general inconsistency in federal Indian policy in general. The very fact that Indian treaties established the tribes as a sovereign entity while at the same time in the wording of the treaties the feds called the tribes “children” and considered them wards of the state is a major contradiction. The use of whiskey in negotiation, a well-documented fact, was in contradiction to their flip flopping policy of restricting the substance from the territory.

Bestymaids points on the government trading factories is perhaps the classic case of federal favoritism to private enterprise. Astor, the head of the American Fur Trade Company, had tremendous political power and used his influence to remove the factories from the frontier as that they were in direct competition to his traders. With the removal of the factories, Astor had a complete monopoly on the American fur trade.

This inconsistency was the result of a general lack of codified federal Indian law and policy. At this time, the last real laws passed on Indian affairs was in 1802, in what is called the Trade and Intercourse act. This act established the rules and procedures for anyone wishing to engage in the Indian trade. Beyond the Act of 1802 Treaties created federal policy directly in the field and crafted policy to the individual tribes or to a specific situation (not all treaties were land cession treaties). This inconsistency caused many frustrations and many loopholes. Andrew Jackson himself expressed extreme frustration with federal Indian policy many times. As a result, he revamped the policy and codified federal Indian law when he was in office. This is why Dodge was able to operate in Indian Territory and get away with it, because the system was insufficient and the federal authority was simply too weak to prevent him. Whereas this does not make him a monster, it does however make him rather savvy, insightful and is a good illustration that he was a risk taker. Yet in the end, it still does not make him right.

Pete

[Robert Braun]

My reading on the fur factors, as illuminated by "bestymaid" and Pete is that the War of 1812 and the subsequent financial drain on Federal financial resources, along with the "Panic of 1819" all but finished the government factors. That allowed J. J. Astor to solidify his hold on the fur trade in the Great Lakes.

I submit that, while the goal and model was that all traders, etc. were to be licensed by the local U. S. Indian Agents or sub-agents, there was plenty of un-licensed trade going on in the region. I would arge that such trade, rather than an issue of "right" vs. "wrong," may be more an issue of semantics.

Here's my reasoning. If the speed limit in one section of Anytown U. S. A. is 25 miles per hour, but the local police do not enforce the speed limit--- there is no speed limit, even though an ordnance is "technically" on the books.

Remember the fun the media had not long ago by uncovering all kind s of whacky ordances that were still on the books? "No spitting in the streets on Sunday!" To do so in a town with that ordnance on the books had technically made a Sunday spitter WRONG in the "right" vs. "wrong" world. However, a lack of any enfocement renders the ordnance moot. I would suggest that the same is true for Pete's immigration example. If the INS looks the other way regarding illegal aliens working for companies and concerns in the southwestern United States (primarily because of a lack of available regional labor) what does that say about our nation's immigration policy? Yes... we have the laws on the books, but so what?

My point here is:

1. I readily concede that Dodge knew he was on Winnebago land. He bartered for it, and won a concession to mine lead, in exchange for valuable consideration, from local Winnebago leadership;

2. I concede that the presence of the blockhouse ALONE makes one suspect that Dodge was not entirely secure in the arrangement (which was Dr. Murphy's assertion.) However, I would also argue that, based on Pete's excellent chronological point on the timing of Dodge's move coming on the heels of the Red Bird Rising, and himself having been a militia organizer, that Dodge's single blockhouse was a prudent precaution in the face of regional "unpredictability";

3. U. S. Indian Agent Marsh indicated in his letters that Dodge initially agreed to some sort of movement when confronted with the government demands. But Dodge, like others before him soon realized that virtually any Federal "enforcement" was a paper tiger due to the undestrengthed and scattered Army assets in the region. Plus, Dodge knew that to be consistant, the Feds would have to remove everyone that had struck a private deal with the native people, including diggers that had penetrated much further into the land than had Dodge.

I would advance the idea that a law unenforced is no law at all-- and an inability to enforce Federal Indian policy renders such policy moot. Since there was an exchange of value between Dodge and Bear, and permission to dig and remove lead in exchange for valuable consideration, he could not, technically, be tresspassing. Not only had Dodge taken a large gamble with his diggings in the region, he was amazingly adroit in utilizing the many complexities present in the area to his general advantage.

Marsh stared at the array of firearms hanging from the walls of Dodge's home, and reported that Dodge claimed he "had a man for every gun" at his blockhouse. I would suggest that THIS fact became the prevelant policy in that area of the Lead District!

[Peter Shrake]

Bob this is truly developing into a fascinating thread!

So when boiled down to the small, correct me if I am wrong, your argument follows along the line of “might makes right.” If Dodge had the power, and the federal agents did not, he could, therefore, nullify federal law and authority and do what he wanted?

If this is the point, I have to disagree with that right. I do agree that some laws are old and obsolete. To enforce such laws is and should be ridiculous. However, to state that ones actions can be legal simply because of any lack of available authority or the lack of willingness to enforce a law still does not make certain actions justifiable. If there had been a larger military force on the Wisconsin frontier, I do think that there would have been an effort to remove Dodge. There are other examples where the army had removed similar business ventures from Indian land. Not only were miners removed from the lead region periodically, David Twiggs at Fort Winnebago sent troops to remove shingle- making parties in the Wisconsin River valley.

I do agree that if one had a license or the right secret handshake one could get into Indian Territory. Corruption and lax enforcement has always been and probably always will be a problem in law enforcement in general. However, in the case of the frontier, despite corruptions, the average Indian Agent in this area was honorable. The same could be said for army officers manning the regions forts. They were faced with a very difficult job. They were the dividing line between two cultures that were not always compatible. Two cultures that were often at each other’s throats. Two cultures that often fought internally amongst themselves. Agents and Army officers had to regulate and control the interrelationship between these two peoples, and they were given very little resources to do this. Now I do not mean to play the sorrowful violin here, but I do want to illustrate the point that some laws even with corrupt leaders or with limited enforcement resources should not be considered void if no one can back them up.

In the case of the lead region, Dodge and others risked open hostilities with the HoChunk because of their actions. There was no guarantee that the tribe would not collectively become angry over incursions onto their land. Red Bird had acted alone in his attacks in 1827. When he surrendered he did so after he was unsuccessful in convincing the entire tribe to join him. However, the long confinement of Red Bird and his accomplices grated at the leaders of the tribe. They had also promised General Atkinson in the summer of ’27, when the army had marched into the heart of HoChunk Territory, that they would not harm any miners if they came upon HoChunk land. They agreed to hold back until commissioners from Washington could arrive the next year to settle the disputes in the lead region. The HoChunk had thought that the commissioners would arrive in the spring of 1828; they did not arrive until the end of the summer in August. HoChunk leaders throughout the tribe were getting very impatient and very angry by then. This is the atmosphere in where Dodge and others entered the tribal territory. This is also why Indian Agents were exasperated at Dodge and others because they were undermining their efforts to keep the frontier at peace until a treaty could be negotiated.

This is why I think Dodge could be criticized for his actions in 1828. Are there cases where laws are silly, impractical, or outdated, yes. Are there corrupt or lax enforcements of laws, yes. But there are also laws that are difficult to enforce but still should be observed. I do like your analogy of the speed limit laws. Does everyone observe 25 mile an hour speed zones, no, but you do not go 65 in them either. Dodge knew the situation on the frontier in 1828. He was right in the middle of Red Birds war the previous year. He had to know that the HoChunk were upset in the summer of ’28. I honestly do not think it is fair to call Dodge an evil man bent on hatred of the Indians. I think, however, Dodge can be called reckless as can others who stepped onto HoChunk Territory in that year.

Your turn

Pete

[Robert Braun]

Great discussion!

Among my points are the observations that Dodge probably knew more than we do today in terms of how much to "stress" the miner/Winnebago relations.

After the Red Bird rising, Dodge moved into the region possbily sensing that the Winnebago were not interested in full scale war with the U.S. Dodge took reasonable precautions, and crafted a (my words) mineral rights deal with local Winnebago. He took up a defensive stance, while expanding a flourishing enterprise both in the extraction of lead and sub-leasing digging rights to others on what would become "Dodge's Camp."

There is no doubt in my mind that Dodge pushed the edge. He also directly challenged Federal authority on the very fringe of that authority. My arguements do not dwell on the "rightness" or "wrongness" of his actions... rather to explore and understand his motivations and his achievements.

There is evidence that, if seriously challenged, Dodge would have backed down... even removed from his negotiated claim. But I think that the very boldness of Dodge's move indicates that he did not seriously fear a concerted effort from the Winnebago. The Marsh letters indicate that he WOULD have likely back down if the Army marched with more muskets than he.

The U. S. Army counted their guns, and we are told they didn't have enough to muster 180 muskets to trump Dodge. We are not told that the Amry or the Indian Agents made any further attempts to remove him--eventually a moot point given the treaties that ensued in the coming months and years... which you correctly point out.

In essence, it wasn't in my opinion, a "might makes right" issue. Dodge presented a bold front, and the Army gave up. Without the Army, the Agents had no leg to stand on. I suspect (but do not know) that had a bold march been made from Fort Crawford to "Dodge's Camp" and Dodge made aware of the Army's impending arrival, he would have likely packed his bags and made for point south. But... how would such a move been interpreted by the Winnebago, give the heightened tensions ensuing from the Red Bird incident?

I suspect there is more to the equation that we do not know. Having said that, Dodge's character in the BHW leads us to believe that he would not shrink from a challenge he thought he could overcome.

My suggestion is not that "might makes right"-- it is that Dodge had more information that we probably have now (in terms of piecing together the incidents) and he knew what he was doing.

So... to carry the speed limit anaology further:

Dodge wasn't going 65 in a 25 zone, IMHO. He knew that other younger bucks had rocketed down Main Street at 8 at night, at 40 m.p.h. aware that the city only runs a couple of vascars at that hour and there few pedestrians to impede that speed. With an impression to be made, as well as money, such a venture would succeed with a little guts and dash.

Well, the radar picked Dodge up at 45. The police pull him over, and threaten to ticket him. Dodge argues that he has a seperate deal with his councilman to drive at this speed, but the officer isn't buying it. He reaches for his ticket book.... but there's another call on the radio. The officer departs with a warning to Dodge... and they go their seperate ways. Dodge has successfully negotiated Main Street--- and motors on.

The precedent has been fairly set. The law is what the law is, but a failure to enforce sends a clear signal to others. Dodge has triumphed by avoiding the hated speeding fines given at the hands of larger authority, and emerges as a hero.

An imperfect analogy... I admit. Add to our story that in the coming year, they raise the speed limit on Mian Street to 45 mph... an activity that had been in the works for some time!

Unfortunately, a few historians chose to ignore the context and chronology when it comes to Dodge's story. While there were many speeders, the investigators neglect to search for witnesses, or other cooberating information. A few merely regurgutate the one high-profile police report found in the files. I suggest that this was Dr. Murphy's methodology.

Your ball! Bob.

[Marge Smith]

From Draper Papers, Thomas Forsyth, Vol. 4 p. 180-183. Letter Forsyth to William Clark dated Fort Armstrong 4th Oct. 1823.
"I have no doubt but some Fox Indians have wrought mines near Fever River last summer (which is annually the case) but in my opinion, they are of infinite then otherwise, because they (the Fox Indians) explore the country and find out where the best mines are and immediately relinquish them to any lessee of the Government as was the case last Spring.
Some Fox Indians found a lead mine last Spring on Apple River, Mr. David Bates took a lease of it from Government, satisfied the Indians for the discovery and all parties are contented, and if I am well informed Mr. Bates finds it a valuable mine, therefore, if the Indians had not discovered the abovementioned lead mine, it would have lay in dormant with many others yet to be explored and must remain so for many years without they are found out by Indians."
My point is that there was a tradition of the Indian selling their discovery to the white man. Of course, this did not take into account land ownership.

[Marge Smith]

The following are licenses issued by Thomas Forsyth. All are for 1 year
Samuel C. Muir 9/22/1822 no place given
Amos Farr 9/22/1822 at Fever River
Geo Davenport 9/28/1822 Rocky Island
Francois Yosti 9/28/1822 Ft. Edwards
David G. Bates 9/15/1824 Fever River
Russel Farnham 9/28/1824 Flint Hills
Maurice Blondeau 9/28/1824 Dirt Lodge, River de Moine
Amos Farrar 10/28/1824 Fever River
Geo Davenport 10/8/1824 Rocky Island
Antoine Gothier 10/8/1824 Rock River
Ettiene Dubois 9/3/1825 Little Macloletic Island
Antoine Brisbois 9/8/1825 Fever River
Ezekial Lockwod 9/8/1825 Fever River
Davenport & Farrar 10/5/1825 Fever River
George Davenport 10/5/1825 50 miles up Rocky RIver
Francois Labasier 9/2/1826 Dirt Lodge
M. S. Cerre 9/15/1826 Flint Hills
George Davenport 9/19/1826 Rocky River
Francois Bouthillier 10/14/1826 Little Macoulty
Francois Bouthiller 10/14/1826 Fever River
Ezekiel Lockwood 10/20/1826 Fever River
Philip Abbott 1/1/1827 Fever River
Willm. Downey 9/25/1826 50 miles up Rocky River
Chas. D. St.Vrain 9/25/1827 50 miles up Rocky River