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Post by Larry Koschkee on Sept 11, 2005 20:53:01 GMT -5
The white flag has been a powerful symbol of truce, parley or surrender for centuries. So powerful that it has stopped advancing armies in their tracks.
The question I have concerning the honor and integrity of the use of the white flag, is that during the Black Hawk War, Black Hawk was willing to use it but the whitemen were unwilling to honor it. Did it depend on who you presented the flag to? If one presented it to the regular Army it would be honored, but when presented to the militia or whitemen, in general, it may or not be honored?
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Post by DJ Palama on Sept 11, 2005 21:14:50 GMT -5
It all would depend on who's in charge of the opposing forces, but looking at all the times Native Americans tried rasing a white flag, most of the time they weren't honored.
-DJ
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Post by Robert Braun on Sept 12, 2005 8:24:22 GMT -5
Current 'popular culture" has it that Black Hawk tried 'surrendering' on three different occasions, and his attempts were rebuffed each time. Many try to use this as a proof of the inherent evil of white Americans --without ever delving even an inch into the historical events and chronology of the incidents.
Without doubt, Larry's questions focus, not on "pupular culture," but on the deeper reasons for the rebuffs.
I think the record is clear that Black Hawk, familair with certainly the rudiments of military decorum from his expereince with the British Army, used the white flag himself on at leats one occasion-- August 1 when he confronted the makeshift gunboat Warrior. (There is some debate over who actually ordered the three emmissaries forward with a white flag at Old Man Creek--BH or Ne-a-pope.)
The specifics of the white flag incidents are enlightening. In point of fact, there were only two such episodes in the BHW: at Old Man Creek, and on the banks of the Mississippi on August 1. Of these, only the latter was an actual bid for parley with an intent to surrender on the part of Black Hawk.
A read of the chronology of the three emisarries at Old Man Creek is instructive. The parley WAS accepted, and the party WAS brought peacibly into Stillman's and Bailey's camp. Only when the party of Indain soldiers (reportedly sent by BH to observe the proceedings) was sighted, did the siutation in the American camp turn ugly, and an emmissary shot 'in cold blood.'
Regarding the August 1 episode, BH, alludes to two white flag in his Autobiography p. 109:
But WHY did the Warrior fire on the band? Captain Throckmorton's report dated August 3 is often used to demonstrate the white man's treachery: "As we neared them, they raised a white flag, and endeavored to decoy us; but we were a little too old for them; for instead of landing, we ordered them to send a boat on board, which they declined." After this, Throckmorton reported that he fired the 6 pounder, followed by a volley of musketry.
Reuben Holmes' letter to Gener Atkinson explained why Throckmorton opened fire:
Indeed, the August 8, 1832 issue of the Galenian reported: "The battle commenced with a discharge from the six pounder, which instantaneously returned by the Indians from above & below, along the shore, when the boat was anchored. It commenced a few minutes before 4 o'clock, P. M. and ended a little after 6 [emphasis added.]" This report mirrored the recollections of John H. Fonda, a volunteer aboard the Warrior and an eyewitness: "The Indians raised a white flag and endeavored to induce the boat to approach the east shore, and succeeded in bringing her close enough to pour a shower of balls into her..." BH's order to his men 'not to fire' was apparently obeyed, but this order did not prevent an element of BH's force from preparing weapons to fire on vessel, which they did "immediately."
From these accounts, it certainly would appear that there was an attempt to use the white flag as a ruse to draw the Warrior in close, in order to pepper the vessel with close-range gunfire.
Based on the evidence, the historical use of (and reaction to) the white flag in the Black Hawk War was somewhat different that "popular culture's" interpretation.
Regards,
Bob Braun.
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Post by pshrake on Sept 12, 2005 10:58:07 GMT -5
This is one of those debates which will linger on as long as there are historians who will study the Black Hawk War. The different interpretations of the events seem to depend on who is believed to be lying or not.
What if both sides told the truth? What if Black Hawks attempts at surrender was genuine as was the initial reception of the surrender? But the tensions and mistrust, that are so natural in any armed conflict, compounded with the ingrained fears and hatered exhibited by both sides, in reality created a situation that was a powderkeg that only needed a spark to set it off.
What if Throkmorton and Black Hawk were both telling the truth? But black hawk could not control the actions of everyone in his band. You have to take into account the hardships and battles fought over the preceeding months. Then look at Throckmorton. Given the events of the last few months it would be prudent not to land the Warrior but rather have a boat come from the shore. Then if several of his crew reported that Indians on the shore were loading their weapons they decided to fire first.
Pete
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Post by Robert Braun on Sept 12, 2005 11:25:53 GMT -5
This is one of those debates which will linger on as long as there are historians who will study the Black Hawk War. The different interpretations of the events seem to depend on who is believed to be lying or not. What if both sides told the truth? What if Black Hawks attempts at surrender was genuine as was the initial reception of the surrender? But the tensions and mistrust, that are so natural in any armed conflict, compounded with the ingrained fears and hatered exhibited by both sides, in reality created a situation that was a powderkeg that only needed a spark to set it off. What if Throkmorton and Black Hawk were both telling the truth? But black hawk could not control the actions of everyone in his band. You have to take into account the hardships and battles fought over the preceeding months. Then look at Throckmorton. Given the events of the last few months it would be prudent not to land the Warrior but rather have a boat come from the shore. Then if several of his crew reported that Indians on the shore were loading their weapons they decided to fire first. Pete Pete raises many valid points. The issues are complex, and his points regarding the emotional and animosity componants are good ones, and worthy of further exploration and discussion. Two points: 1. My comments regarding the Old Man Creek white flag incident is interesting because BH in his Autobioggraphy never stated or indicated that he wanted to surrender at that time. The white flag was a signal for parley, which certainly BH knew all about from his military experiences with the British in the War of 1812. In contrast, the clear indicatation from his own description of the Warrior incident showed he DID wish to surrender at that time. 2. My comments do not make a presumption on who was lying or at what time-- or if anyone was lying for that matter. Rather, my intent was to build an historical context for understanding the incidents better, based on the words of the participants. =============================== MEA CULPA. In my previous post, I indicated that there were two "white flag incidents" durng the Black Hawk War. There were, in fact at least THREE such incidents. The first incident occured on April 23 at the Prophet's Village. There, Henry Gratiot carried General Atkinson's embassy to Black Hawk under a white flag. During his stay at the village, Gratiot was made a virtual prisoner in a lodge, until his secretary paid a ransom. During this time, Gratiot's white flag was torn down by BH's young men, and according to one account, a British flag raised. I wonder how this incident should be viewed, in light of the questions offered in this thread? =========================== Best regards, Bob Braun |
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Post by Larry Koschkee on Sept 13, 2005 9:23:58 GMT -5
As Pete appropriately pointed out, there are no simple answers to my questions and I agree the subject is quite complex.
Bob did speak to my specific curiosity and query when he said: "without doubt, Larry's questions focus, not on "popular culture", but on the deeper reasons for the rebuffs."
After examining the results of Black Hawk's white flag offerings to the Illinois Militia and Captain Throckmorton, one can not help but surmise, Black Hawk may have faired better dealing with Regular Army.
Example: At the conclusion of the 1827 Winnebago War, Red Bird came into the Regular Army camp at The Portage under a white flag. This flag was honored without incident.
Militia units in the BH were considered an effective force by many of the participants (except the Regulars) and later by historians, however it is clear they exhibited a major shortcoming in diplomacy or negotation. Was this shortcoming due to:
1) Inexperience?
2) Lack of traning and discipline?
3) Distrust of Indians?
4) Or all of the above?
If we select #3 - Distrust of Indians - is there sufficient evidence or accounts where Indians used the white flag to "bait and switch" or set a trap for the unwary on the frontier which this message board addresses?
When I started this thread, somehow I knew Robert Braun would insert the white flag incident involving the perceived imprisonment of Henry Gratiot as a comparison with Stillman's Run and Battle of Bad Axe. At the same time, I knew what my response would be. Was there any bloodshed? Was anyone in Gratiots entourage Killed?
Larry
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Post by Robert Braun on Sept 13, 2005 10:36:50 GMT -5
My continued thanks to Larry for his reasoned and thoughtful commentary.
Two matters: the white flag incident at the Prophet's Village vs. the other incidents in the BHW and the Winnebago War, and "why the diplomatic short-comings with the Sac/Fox and specifically Black Hawk?
1. The Prophetstown white flag incident. Larry is very correct when he points out that the incident did not result in bloodshed... primarily because Gratiot and Cubbage were warned to vamoose, which they did. There is no doubt in my mind that had they stayed they risked significant injury or death at the hands of BH''s young men. (This of course begs a lesser question on the control and discipline he actually exerted over his warriors-- discipline clearly evident during the BHW, but absent at Prophetstown. Why?
I think the issue here is that Gratiot's flag was initially respected, then lowered or torn down amid threats of violence-- this scenario was substantially "replayed" in Stillman's camp along Old Man Creek.
2. I think both you and Pete have hit upon the significant mistrust of native people in the minds of many in the militia. There are reasons for this mistrust... chief among them the fact that BH backed an old nemisis--the British-- during the War of 1812. Sauk indians have been among those held responsible for the murder of captured American wounded after the American surrender at the Battle of Raisin River (Frenchtown.) The stories of this treachery lingered long after the war ended. Major Zachary Taylor too had reason for vengeance, smarting over BH's ambush of Taylor's batteaux near the Rock River Rapids in 1814.
I have alluded to the mistruct of the Indian soldiers sent by BH to oversee the Sauk emmissaries at Old Man Creek. I have established that native soldiers were readying weapons during BH's "white flag" surrender attempt on August 1 (recognizing-- as Pete has pointed out-- they may have been doing this against BH's instructions.) In between these episodes, the string of murders and atrocities pinned --rightfully or not-- on BH and his band fueled signifiant animostiy and fanned the flames of revenge.
Speaking of revenge, I would point to the unbridled and frankly undisciplined conduct of the Regulars at the August 2 Battle of the Mississiipi as a clue to their "receptive" demeanor. I agree with Larry that earlier in the conflict, even after Old Man Creek, the Regulkars would most probably have been more receptive to a parley. As the war progressed, and as August 2 proved, their temperment changed for the worse.
Best regards,
Bob.
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Post by Larry Koschkee on Sept 13, 2005 13:16:13 GMT -5
Bob has expanded this discussion quite well and elaborated on some excellent points regarding mistrust on the part of the Americans.
The first comment I have is the apparent mistrust Throckmorton and passengers exhibited on the Warrier due to viewing the Indians on the river bank shielding themselves behind trees and guns readied...
BH's band is preparing to cross the Mississippi River and out of the mist appears the Warrior with a mounted cannon and boat load of volunteers. Not knowing if there were more boats then just the Warrior and not knowing the intentions of people on board the Warrior... would it not be prudent for the band to excercise some precaution until things are sorted out?
Secondly, Bob touched on a possible revenge motive with Major Zachory Taylor because of the September , 1814 Sauk attack on his boats at the mouth of the Rock River. I believe the historical account surrounding this incident indicated the strategy Taylor put in place was to lure the Sauk into a council with a WHITE FLAG and then kill as many Sauk as possible. What honor and integrity is exhibited in that ruse?
Third - Bob suggested that the Regulars may have been disciplined in the beginning of the campaign and Black Hawk may have treated favorably at the time. However, as the chase progressed the Regulars demeanor may have soured to the point that a white flag may not been honored. Would the frustration of not catching Black Hawk for months eliminate the stoic honor and integrity of the Regular Army officers?
Larry
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Post by Robert Braun on Sept 13, 2005 13:49:07 GMT -5
Again... excellent observations and commentary.
My thoughts include...
1. I am struck by the fact that BH trusted Throckmorton and his pennant such that a.) he determined to give himself up to him, and b.) reportedly directed his warriors not to fire while he negotiated.
That some of the warriors chose to do therwise might not only indicate martial prudence in the face of an uncertain foe. It might indicate what I will describe as a significant disconnect between BH, his leadership, and the acceptance of his leadership by his remaining band. (This disconnect may have found both words in actions in the August 1 evening council, which rejected most of BH's recommendations-- and caused BH to leave the band later that night.)
2. I am not familiar with the details of Major Taylor's plans in September, 1814, and admit that I have not heard this take on the proceedings. Perhaps Larry can unearth a passage or two that can help us understand if and why Taylor would consider such a deception.
3. I readily concede that frustration could have played a major role in the Regular's declining morale and "discipline" as the campaign wore on. Clearly, the professional officer cadre lost control of their troops on August 2. But why?
If the reader will permit me a slight deviation in this thread, I submit that frustration with Black Hawk alone was not and could not tell the whole story. Include insufficient rest, poor nourishment (albiet better by far than that enjoyed by BH's people), clothing and shoes literally falling to pieces in the march to the Mississippi River, a desire to trump the the militia after the success Wisconsin Heights and elsewhere, and at least one major-turned Lieutenant-Colonel with a major score to settle with BH, coupled with a commanding officer whose reputation as a failed field commander has been spattered all over Washington--and now is anxious, even desperate, for redemption...
I'm starting to form the opinion that fifty Black Hawks with 100 white flags would have made much difference to the Regulars on the morning of August 2.
Best always,
Bob.
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Post by Larry Koschkee on Sept 13, 2005 16:02:19 GMT -5
Bob said: "I'm starting to form the opinion that fifty Black Hawk's with 100 white flags would have made (not) much difference to the Regulars on the morning of August 2."
I second that summation, Bob and add one more. No difference to the Militia on the morning of August 2.
Larry
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Post by DJ Palama on Sept 13, 2005 17:32:02 GMT -5
Hi Robert,
Sorry I know that BH only tried to surrender once, I meant to say through out the history of Native/European.
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Post by Larry Koschkee on Sept 14, 2005 7:18:39 GMT -5
Bob is looking for some documentation to substantiate my posting reference to Major Zacahary Taylor's plan to use a white flag to draw the Sauk into council at the mouth of Rock River and pounce on them.
BLACK HAWK AND THE WARRIOR'S PATH, Roger L. Nichols, Harlan Davidson, Inc., Wheeling, IL pg 56
Larry
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Post by Robert Braun on Sept 14, 2005 7:33:48 GMT -5
Hi Robert, Sorry I know that BH only tried to surrender once, I meant to say through out the history of Native/European. I understood yor comment. My postings were aimed at curent popular thought, which I think I was careful to point out. Bob. |
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Post by Robert Braun on Sept 14, 2005 7:34:55 GMT -5
Bob is looking for some documentation to substantiate my posting reference to Major Zacahary Taylor's plan to use a white flag to draw the Sauk into council at the mouth of Rock River and pounce on them. BLACK HAWK AND THE WARRIOR'S PATH, Roger L. Nichols, Harlan Davidson, Inc., Wheeling, IL pg 56 Larry Many thanks... I hope to look deeper into this episode. Best, Bob. |
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