Conditions in the war-party.

[Robert Braun]

Since the entire Kickapoo war-party was killed in the ensuing "Battle of Bloody Lake" June 16, 1832, the only chroniclers we have are the recollections of the militia volunteers. Clues found within these recollections have revealed some interesting possibilities:

1. During the massacre at Spafford's Field, one account recorded that one of the warriors chased after some of the men while mounted on Spafford's plow-horse. Why would he do that if he was already riding a horse? Charles Bracken observed the war-party from the top of a ridgeline that overlooked the Pecatonica River. He wrote:

There were the Indians approaching us; they were moving in what might be called common time. Their chief, a gray-headed warrior, was walking backward, and appeared to be earnestly addressing his young men. After observing them for a few moments, we fired, but I think without effect.

These are mostly references to being dismounted! Is is fair to presume that the war-party was on foot, or mostly on foot? This would certainly explain the rapidity with which Dodge's mounted force caught up with the Kickapoo on the morning of June 16.

2. We know from the account of Bennett Million that he managed to escape death at Spafford's Field by racing to the nearby river and hugging the near bank for some 300 yards before being discovered. Million plunged into the river, and swam underwater to the far bank, and reportedly sprang up the steep riverbank in a single bound “amid a shower of bullets” which perforated his shirt and hat. This certainly suggests that the Kickapoo were armed with rifles... but whose? Their own or ones picked up from Spafford and his chums?

Eighteen-year-old Private Halstead S. Townsend witnessed the body of the murdered Henry Apfel and with his comrades observed that his rifle and shot pouch had been taken.

Could it be that the Kickapoo, although well-armed with belt knives, tomahawks, and spears, were not all equipped with firearms? Is it fair to observe that this apparent lack of firearms played into Dodge's thinking when he ordered the charge against the Kickapoo at the pond embankment?

[Larry Koschkee]

Examining the militia accounts of the Battle of the Pecatonica or Bloody Lake or Bloody Pond or Horse Shoe Bend, you would have to agree, is a study of contradictions.

Having said that, Bob... In my opinion, what is stated here in this thread and the militia accounts I have read regarding the extent of firearms the Kickapoo possessed, does not indicate that each and every Kickapoo had a firearm nor does it suggest they did not.

I would answer in the affirmative to your question Is it fair to presume that the war-party was on foot, or mostly on foot?. Your quote of Charles Bracken about the Kickapoo commander "walking backward" is a good clue.

In Peter Parkinson, Jr.'s narrative he said Million was pursued by five Indians for ten miles. It is very unlikely that a Million could have out run five mounted Indians unless Million had a supernatural experience.

It was clear the Kickapoo were taking advantage of thickets, low ground and steep stream banks to slow the mounted militia. If the Indians were mounted the terrain they chose would have the same delay effect on them.

Two militia accounts said Major Kirkpatrick's dog took up the Indian trail. Would that dog track horses, which are common or would the dog be more prone to pickup a strange scent such as an Indian on foot? I go with the latter.

Dodge said: They retreated through a thicket of undergrowth almost impassable for horsemen... In running our horses about two miles, we saw them about half a mile ahead, trotting along at their ease; they were making for the low ground where it would be difficult for us to pursue them on horseback.

Dodge also said the Indians had about a thirty minutes start. This lead would be very difficult to overcome if the Indians were mounted and the horses not rode down. If the Indians were fleeing on horeseback from the scene of Apple's murder they could have achieved a distance of 4.25 miles in thirty minutes with a combination flight of equal time of a 5mph trot and 12 mph gallop.

Good topic Bob...

BTW, did you not have a thread on this message board regarding the militia numbers versus the Kickapoo numbers at Bloody Lake? I could not locate it...

Larry K.

[Robert Braun]

Larry... excellent analysis!

I agree that the accounts-- varied and occasionally contradictory though they may be-- do seem to indicate that the Kickapoo were not armed to a man with firearms. It would appear that a few may well have been armed prior to Spafford's Field. Others gained arms from those in the possession of Omri Spafford and others, plus the murdered Henry Apfel.

I am forming the impression that Dodge suspected as much-- that the Kickapoo war party may well be incompletely armed with firearms. This I think may start to explain his audacious (and to our modern eyes parhaps foolhardy) charge to draw the first fire of the Kickapoo. Foolish or not... I am convinced it took guts to up against the Kickapoo regardless of how well they were armed!

As for the dismounted state of the war-party, I think this is a vital piece to understanding this segment of the conflict. It is also a piece that seems to elude most students of the war... as it did me until only recently.

At a brisk walking pace, over the rolling but generally open terrain of this portion of present-day Lafayette County, I suspect the war party was able to cover about a mile and a half in the available thirty-minute head start-- more if they were jogging or "trotting along at their ease" as recalled by Dodge.

As for the numbers thread... you're right... it is missing. We've has some challeges with the board of late. We'll have to resurrect that thread somehow...

[Mike Thorson]

If there are problems with missing posts I'm not aware of it and if it is happening I dont know why. You can try to do a search of keywords and make sure to put in how far back to search (number of days). That might find it for you.

Some posts have been moved around here and there. Other threads that were overly contentious were deleted outright by me.

In any case it's always a good idea to cut & paste stuff you want to 'save' into a doc on your own hard drive for future reference just in case stuff goes missing.

[Larry Koschkee]

Bob... I am not thourghly convinced as you appear to be that the Kickapoo were under-gunned nor do I see any evidence that Dodge calculated a under-gunned enemy into his bold decision to charge. But no matter if we differ... 171 years latter we are still fighting the Second Battle of the Pecatonica. Don't you think that would be a good title for another thread or a new published work on the BHW?

Focusing back to this thread, I would like to comment on your statement: This I think may start to explain his audacious (and to our modern eyes perhaps foolhardy) charge to draw the first fire of the Kickapoo. Correct me if I am wrong, but Dodge and others said they were advancing, received fire, then charged.

Dodge:I formed my men on foot at open order, and at trailed arms... They commenced the fire, when three of my men fell, two dangerously wounded, one severly but not dangerously. I instantly ordered a charge on them.

I agree with you that Dodge and his men showed a lot of courage and intestinal fortitude to advance and charge the "invisible" Kickapoo. Dodge set the stage for this brave act days before. I will preface my explanation, first, by saying that Dodge's demeanor, temperment and leadership qualities have been refered to previously on this message board. Simply, he was by his nature, a motivator and leader of men, intense and focused to the task at hand.

I will skate out on thin ice here and give my impression (you know I hate to use that word in a historical sense) of Dodge setting the stage for undaunted courage at Bloody Lake.

Since the alarm went out in the mining district, that Black Hawk was in the neighborhood, Old Colonel Dodge was in perpetual motion, forming militia companies, commanding settlers and miners to "fort up," holding councils with Indians, arresting Indians, scouring the countryside for the elusive enemy, burying settlers, writing dispatchs and etc.

On the 15th of June, he and his men had just returned from a long campaign trail and dispersed from Gratiot's Grove for some much needed rest. That same day word got to Dodge at Fort Union that there had been a massacre at Spafford's farm. Dodge left for Fort Hamilton via Blue Mound Fort, rested a bit there and left for Fort Hamilton. He was so intense that he did not wait for the militia company to eat their breakfast and departed without them with two militian men. The two men could not keep up with him, Dodge arriving at the fort ahead of them.

Apple was killed just outside of the fort and increased the focus and intensity of Dodge and he let loose a motivator, rally speech.

(Parkinson's Narrative) Fellow soldiers! we shall immediately follow the Indians, whose hands are now reeking with the blood of one of our neighbors and fellow citizens whome they have just slain. We must overtake them, if possible. Their numbers are unknown; but numerous as they may be, I shall charge them sword in hand; and if there are any among you who think you cannot do this, you will fall back now, as I want none with me, except those upon whom I can rely, with the utmost confidence, in any and every emergency. The chase was on with the focused, intense Dodge with his men willing to follow the enemy straight to hell if necessary.

When the Kickapoo finally stood their ground at the horse shoe bend of the Pecatonica the Old Colonel barked orders and readied his men with this speech: (Bracken's Narrative) Within that thicket are the foe, whose hands are yet reeking with the blood of our murdered friend! That it was his intention to enter it; in doing so, some of us must fall; that it might be his own fate; but that his mind was made up to whip the enemy or die in the attempt. if any feared to follow him, he wanted them to fall back then, and not when they encountered the Indians.

After receiving fire from the Kickapoo, Dodge gave the order Charge 'em boys, damn them, charge 'em!" At that very moment in time I believe the men would have followed the intense, determined Dodge into hell and back....

Too bad there is already a Hollywood movie To Hell and Back.

I submit it would not have made a difference if the Kickapoo were armed to the teeth, all with firearms, the outcome would have been the same... a battle cry to charge from Old Dodge...

I apologize to the moderators for this non-scholary outburst. I suspect the cause is the infectious intensity of Col. Henry Dodge

Larry Koschkee

[Robert Braun]

Good catch, Larry. The accounts clearly indicate that Dodge clearly charged AFTER the first fire of the Kickapoo.

In conceding this, however, I maintain my thinking that Dodge may have had a sense that the Kickapoo were under-gunned.

Here's the evidence that seems to point that way:

1. The accounts of the return to Spafford's Field indicate no mention of the slain militiamen's guns. While one may assert that there were few guns mentioned in ANY account of the fight, it makes sense that the militimen brought their guns with them. A serpent estucheon plate from a trade gun and a lock were found in the Pecatonica several decades ago... perhaps the weapon of Bennett Million? Later, Million reported having raced up the far river bank "amid a shower of bullets"--clearly fired at him by the Kickapoo. Were these guns brought to Spafford's Field by the Kickapoo? Or were they the militiamen's own weapons? I suggest the latter, as we don't read of gunfire from Millions' recollections until this segment in the Spafford Field episode. The dead of Spafford Field might account for four firearms;

2. Regarding the finding of the murdered Henry Apfel, eighteen-year-old Halstead S. Townsend remembered that some in the party observed that Apfel’s rifle and shot pouch had been taken. It makes sense that the prudent Kickapoo would not overly burden themselves with multiple firearms and equipage on each man, particularly if they were on foot. Most likely, the man who took Apfel's gun and shot pouch appropriated it for his own use because he didn't have a firearm;

3. Townsend's recollection of the taking of Apfel's firearm MAY indicate (but certainly does not prove) a similar situation at Spafford's Field. What is does say is that the Kickapoo were gathering firearms;

4. A compilation of Stevens, Wakefied, and Smith indicates that the first fire came when a portion of Dodge's line was forty feet away. That's less that fifteen yards... or close to "whites of the eyes" distance. And it was pretty effective-- Peter Parkinson claimed he had a lock of his hair shot way by a musket ball. Samuel Black was hit in the head over an ear by a glancing shot, causing a severe skull fracture; Thomas Jenkins shot through the hip; and Montaville Morris fell mortally wounded. That's four hits. From... say four guns?

5. We know that the gray haired warrior-- likely the principal warrior of the war-party-- had a firearm; his piece failed to fire as he took aim at Dodge, whose own weapon failed to fire due to wet priming.

6. We know that Samuel Wells was apparently shot as the hand to hand combat ensued. This was very likely the last Kickapoo shot fired, if in fact Wells was shot by a Kickapoo. Townsend stated that he was, even though Townsend himself was a horseholder and probably not a participant in the fight at the pond embankment. Given the very short duration of the struggle at the pond embankment, and the desperate nature of the struggle, I am not of the opinion that there would have necessarily been sufficient time to reload a firearm. Was this the fifth and final shot from a captured militia firearm?

7. Peter Parkinson reported that:

The conflict was deadly and decisive. The Indian tomahawk and spear were pitted against the white man’s bayonet and [musket] breech.

No mention of gunfire here.

==================

I suggest that Dodge, as an experienced soldier, quickly questioned the men as to the possible strength of the war-party from the men at Fort Hamilton, maybe even Bennett Million. Dodge himself witnessed the condition of Apfel, and the fact his weapon was taken. I am forming the opinion that Dodge had to have some assessment of his opponants prior to leaving Fort Hamilton.

I advance the theory that:

A. Dodge's boldness may have been potentiated by the small size (relatively speaking) of the horse-less war-party. I suggest that Dodge's audacity was furthered by his suspicion that he and his detachment outgunned the Kickapoo.

B. These factors come into play in Dodge's deployment of his remaining men. In the approach to the pond embankment, his men are placed in open order, with arms at a trail. He know the thick brush will slow his advance, and he probably knows that the first indication that the Indians are in the vicinity is their first fire. The open order deployement of the men will accomplish two things: allow a greater space of ground to be covered with the available men and hopefully minimize casualties.

C. Factoring all this together, Dodge is perfectly willing to risk himself and his men to draw the first fire with this skirmish line... in hopes that the ensuing action will be against an enemy with unloaded muskets. He has deployed his men for precisely this outcome.

D. The Kickapoo fired at close range. Now if, for example, the entire war-party-- save one-- fired at a portion of Dodge's line at forty feet distance and scored three hits and one wing, that's a 25% hit ratio. No very impressive. Further, we might expect multiple hits from say a 50% hit ratio. Based on what we know, the militiamen were not wounded by multiple hits. We can draw many conclusions from these clues-- among them either (1.) the Kickapoo were terrible shots or (2.) they were decent shots with very few firearms among them.

Given the plain fact that apparently none of the militiamen had been in actual combat before--- and to go up against such a formidable foe as the Kickapoo and defeat them all in a stand-up, hand-to-hand fight... is in my estimation, a pretty remarkable achievement.

[Larry Koschkee]

Bob... you have certainly made a compelling case regarding the extent of firearms in the Kickapoo war party and the Dodge's assessement of the strength of that party. Heretofore, I would have found common ground with your case but further examination of historical accounts leads me to part ways on many of your talking points.

Rather than take your individual points and provide counter points I will just come forth with my views.

First of all, once again, I will state my stance on the amount of guns possesed by the Kickapoo war party, that is: The material I have reviewed is equivocal to the amount of firearms. Secondly, I agree with you that Dodge had probably calculated the size of the war party in his bold actions, but the size had no consequence. In advancing the last statement I quote militiaman Mattthew G. Fitch's account of the six militia men plowing and hoeing a piece of corn at Spafford's farm located at the forks of the East and West Peckatonica River. While thus engaged a party of thirty or forty Indians advanced within thirty paces of them, before they were discovered. The devoted little party ran with all possible speed for their rifles, which had been left a short distance; at the same moment the savages discharged a volley...

Fitch stated this information was contained in an express that arrived in Mineral Point, at 8 o'clock in the evening, two days previous to the Battle of the Pecatonica. If the people of Mineral Point received this message we can assume Dodge at Fort Union received the same details, thus Dodge would have had an estimate of the size of the war party before his arrival at Fort Hamilton. Charles Bracken says he did: Captain Hoard at once despatched an express, communicating the information to General Dodge, at Dodgeville. If Dodge did not have the details and as you suggest quickly questioned the men as to the possible strength of the war-party from the men at Fort Hamilton. Bear in mind Million, an eyewitness, was at the fort. I submit Dodge was expecting to confront a much larger war party than the 17 killed in the battle.

As referenced previously, Fitch states the Indians discharged a volley when the five men were running for their rifles. Peter Parkinson, Jr. stated: Million crossed the river at the same place and the same time that McIlwain and John Bull crossed it. Charles Bracken stated: McIlwain and John Bull attempted to escape across it, and were shot in the water; their bodies were taken out of the river by us." If McIlwain and John Bull reached the river armed approximately the same time as Million. The Kickapoo did not have their weapons to shoot at Million.

It also is a good possibility that McIlwain and Bull's rifles went into the river after they were shot and were not recovered by the Kickapoo or at the least could not have been used to shoot at Spencer and Million because of wet powder.

We know the Kickapoo did not get Spencer's gun because he shot an Indian off the plow horse with it.

If Million had a firearm - he did not say. It would have been rendered useless anyway when (according to Bracken) Million plunged into the stream, which was about fifty yards wide at that point, and never raised his head above water until he struck the opposite shore. Had Million possessed a firearm up to the time he dove into the water, he most likely gave it a toss into the stream so the Kickapoo could not get their hands on it, or then again, if the weapon had a sling he could have, however with great difficulty, slung it across his back and swam. I tend to believe the former.

As you reported - Million raced up the far river bank amid a shower of bullets. How many rifle balls would be in a shower? 2, 4, 6, 10 or more?

Million stated: after getting upon the bank, I found two balls had passed thru my shirt - one through the body, the other through the sleeve. While upon the bank, two balls passed so near me that their force was visibly felt in my face. My hat was afterwards found, with a large ball hole near the band.

I submit that the kickapoo would only have the use of one militia firearm, that of Spafford's, who upon reaching his weapon stood his ground. In order for the Kickapoo to use his weapon on the remaining men it had to be reloaded on the dead run to keep pace with the other militia men fleeing for their lives.

[Larry Koschkee]

I agree that the Kickapoo were collecting munitions whenever possible for several reasons. Replace a damaged rifle, upgrade to a better model, maintain a second weapon or outfit a member of the group that did not possess one. But anyone of these examples do not foretell a overall lack of firearms or being under-gunned.

To the contrary, I do not believe an Indian on foot carrying two long arms would be burdened. Travelling light and living off the land, one firearm slung across the back and the other at ready arms while on the warpath with the militia and federals after your hide seems to me - prudent.

Down at the horseshoe bend of the Pecatonica River, the Kickapoo inflicted four casualities. Bob Braun suggested a couple of reasons for the low number of hits. (1) the Kickapoo were terrible shots or (2) they were decent shots with very few firearms among them. My suggestion is it was due to (1) the terrain and (2) some of the armed Indians had wet powder.

Dodge said the militia charge after the first volley from the Indians at the horseshoe bend placed them amongst the Indians on a piece of ground not to exceed sixty feet square.

We know the militia were advancing in open order formation when they were fired uoon. One militia account said they could not see the smoke from the Indian volley beacuse the landscape was so thick. The 17 Kickapoo were fortified behind a breastworks approx. 60' long using Dodge's numbers. I assert that the open order advance and thick cover only allowed the Kickapoo to see just a few militia men directly in front of them in, other words they had a narrow field of view.

The militia men in that narrow field of view were the only targets in the Kickapoo volley. Some of the Kickapoo did not have a target in that first volley. The shock of Dodge's charge in the thick undergrowth probably contributed to the low militia casualties.

As stated previously, another reason for the low casualties inflicted by the Kickapoo was wet gun powder. The Indians crossed water on more than one occasion before standing their ground at the horseshoe bend.

Interesting debate Robert Braun.

Larry Koschkee

[Robert Braun]

Larry, your analysis in "Present Arms 1 & 2" is excellent.

A few issues do remain however. Despite what Fitch, Brachen, and Parkinson the Junior have written... they were unfortunately neither eyewitnesses nor participants to this particular incident. There can be only one "credible" source to the events on June 14: Bennett Million. What I mean by this is-- Fitch and Parkinson had to get their material from someone or something. That leaves Million as the primary (perhaps only) credible witness.

The numbers game. In terms of the warning sent to Fort Defiance and eventually to Fort Union, we are informed that David Wells "bloodied his horse by spurring" in order to bring word to Fort Defiance. I agree with Larry that Dodge would have received an initial assessment of the strenght of the war-party at this point. The sole source for this information would have been Bennett Million... and we don't know what he said or how it was modified (if at all) upon arrival at Fort Defiance.

Million and the detachment of men sent to Spafford's Field the next day would have had an opportunity to more cooly review the signs left on the field and river bank to perhaps better assess the size of the party. Whether or not they could make an adequate assessment I don't know. But I am comfortable in asserting that this was one of their purposes.

With whatever updated information Dodge was able to glean from the burial expedition-- Dodge set out with his volunteers. The most opportune time for Dodge to learn the size and strength of the war-party may have been from a sighting reported by Charles Bracken:

There were the Indians approaching us; they were moving in what might be called common time. Their chief, a gray-headed warrior, was walking backward, and appeared to be earnestly addressing his young men. After observing them for a few moments, we fired, but I think without effect. My comrades, after discharging their guns, retreated down the hollow, which we had ascended, and I turned westwardly up the ridge overlooking the East Pecatonica, keeping out of gun-shot [range], but watching the enemy closely.

If this story is accurate, Dodge may well have had a reasonably accurate report of the size of the war party prior to crossing the Pecatonica-- from Charles Bracken.

Daniel Day-Lewis. I agree that the Kickapoo could, would, and did gather arms for any of the reasons you stated. However, given the varieties of caliber of weapons available on the frontier-- the key to one man operating multiple firearms is having the ball ammunition that fits the caliber of the weapons. So... unless we're ready to embrace the image of a "Last of the Mohicans" run with extra weapons, I suggest that any warriors armed with multiple weapons were carrying "one gun/ one shot" and expecting to reload the firearm they were either a.) most comfortable with or b.) had the most ammunition. I question whether or not carrying multiple weapons for that purpose... the weight of the weapon plus accompanying shot pouch, etc. was worth it... particularly to men on foot trying to outdistance pursuers that wer esure to be mounted.

Muzzle blasts Dodge's line most probably was formed in accordance with the following instructions: “The habitual interval between files will be six paces [about 15 feet] in open ground; but in woods or broken ground it may be increased.” This mean that theoretically, his twenty man skirmish line was at least 285 feet (95 yards) long. That's nearly the length of a football field--- and impossible to maintain for casually drilled men in thick brush advancing in their first action against an armed and determined foe! In my experience, the human tendancy is to compress the line, or "bunch up," rather than maintain the interval between men--- and I suggest that's exactly what some of them did.

Add to this the June 18 letter sent to General Atkinson by Dodge and quoted in Whitney: ... the men rushed forward and literally shot the Indians all to pieces. We were, Indians & whites, on a piece of ground not to exceed 40 square feet. Sixteen warriors dispersed equally along 40 feet of pond embankment suggests an interval of less than three feet between men. Since the Kickapoo probably did not fight in complaince with a standard tactics manual of the day, the interval was probably less.

I agree with Larry that a only a portion of Dodge's line struck the pond embankment where lay the Kickapoo. However, I submit that the Kickapoo should have been able to bring more guns to bear on whatever militia targets presented themselves. We do not read a record of multiple hits... nor do we read of another Kickapoo "volley" after the first fire-- just sporratic shots. Certainly, Larry's observation of the "shock" value gained by Dodge's charge played into this segment of the fight. However, I submit the single additional militia casualty again would allow one to draw one of several conclusions: their powder was wet; they were poor shots; They were under-gunned; they were over-gunned; they were very good shots with whatever operational arms they had; etc., etc.

The effect was still the same--- Dodge had them outgunned and I think he knew it or at least suspected it. I believe this single fact accounts in a large part for the outcome in the "hand-to-hand phase" of the action, where a determined group of Kickapoo were all killed, with the loss of a single militiaman.

Epilogue: I was out to the battle ground last Friday afternoon. The local "Sportsman's Alliance" group has done a wonderful job of clean-up, signage, and road improvement. The "Friends of Woodford Park" have put together a nice brochure as well.

[Larry Koschkee]

Bob... as I continue to sort out all the contradictions in the Pecatonica battle, you threw in a curveball in your last post to this thread: The numbers game. In terms of the warning sent to Fort Defiance and eventually to Fort Union, we are informed that David Wells "bloodied his horse by spurring" in order to bring word to Fort Defiance

Charles Bracken said: About sundown on the 14th of June 1832, a horseman without a hat, "bloody with spurring," was seen approaching Fort Defiance, a stockade post situated on Section No. 20, Town No., 4, North, Range No. 3 East, commanded by Captain Robert C. Hoard. The rider was David Gilbert.

Would you please advise source that stated the rider was David Wells. Thanks...

In addition, Bob do you have details on what happened to Abraham Searls at the Spafford's Farm massacre?

Larry Koschkee

[Robert Braun]

Sorry about that curve, Larry. My source appears to be Smith, Vol. 3, but I'll have to go back and check the hard copies to be certain. The schedule says that this will take me a few days to do.

Will look for mentions of Searls, although I fear there is little mention beyond his name appearing a few times. SInce I don't know, I'll stop for now and add this look-up to the list.

Great discussion

Bob.

[Sailor98]

I too would appreciate any additional information/reference to Abraham Searls. My wife is descended from this Searls line which goes back to the settling of Springfield, MA in the 1630's. Hence my interest. This family went west with the frontier. From New England, Ohio, and to the Midwest. They were involved in several bloody episodes during the many American/Indian confrontations as America moved west. Including one Isaiah Searls who was held captive for 9 years in canada as a result of Queen Anne's War. I was able to mention this Searls to her from my interest in the Black Hawk war but we can find little information on what exactly happened to him. If I remember correctly, he was listed in the 1827 Militia rolls.

Dan Brunner
Burlington, WI

[Robert Braun]

I finally located my photocopies of William R. Smith, Vol. 3 relating to the battle of Pecatonica.

There it is... Page 200... "The rider was David Gilbert."

I think that gremlin in my computer system needs to be purged!

Bob.

[Robert Braun]

An "A. D. Searls" appears on the muster roll for Captain James M. Strode's company of volunteers, having served from August 26 to September 2, 1827--- during the Winnebago War.

Abraham Searles was listed on the 1830 U. S. Census for Iowa County, Michigan Territory. Apparently, there was only him in his household. The census taker listed him as being between 20 and 30 years of age.

Abraham shows up on the roster of militiamen for Captain William "Billy" Hamilton at Hamilton's Diggings. Hamilton's Company was mustered in on May 2, 1832, the first company from Iowa County so mustered.

Beyond the mentions of his name in connection with the Spafford's Field massacre, and his name on the cenotaph at Hoffman cemetery, there are no readily apparent entries in Whintey's, or the circa 1880s histories of Iowa and La Fayette Counties regarding Searles. I would offer a pure speculation, that he shared the fate of Omri Spafford.

Bob.

[Larry Koschkee]

Bob... thanks for clearing up the question raised on who was the rider on the bloodied horse, bearing the bad news of the Spafford Farm massacre and many thanks for the additional information on Abraham Searles..

Larry K.