Black Hawk... Ready or not?

[Robert Braun]

Occasionally, we read that BH was intending to set up an ambush of sorts at WH... a concept that has been debated in part in earlier editions of this board.

In the 1882 edition of his Autobiography, BH is translated as saying:

Neapope, with a party of twenty, remained in our rear, to watch for the enemy, whilst we were proceeding to the Wisconsin, with our women and children. We arrived, and had commenced crossing over to an island, when we discovered a large body of the enemy coming towards us. We were now compelled to fight, or sacrifice our wives and children to the fury of the whites. I met them with fifty warriors, (having left the balance to assist our women and children in crossing) about a mile from the river, when an attack immediately commenced.

Na-pope, as many readers will recall, deserted the British Band, along with his warriors. BH claimed eventually all except Na-pope returmed.

It would seem from this account, that ambush was not on BH's mind...despite the nature of the ground at Wisconsin Heights that seems to set such a perfect stage for ambush.

What do you think? r.

[Gene]

No way...it was survival time. The game was up, he knew it and was looking for a way out. I walked to ground at the W.H. battlefield, if Black Hawk had the time, resources and wasn't dragging around starving followers. That ground could have been effectively exploited, any good platoon leader, Sgt or someone with a basic understanding of terrain could have / should have seen it. But they were not up for the fight.

Refering to Thayers work on that battle, it seems (though confused) that the indians may have also been attempting to surrender after the fight. But the only person who could translate their attempted calls to the militia there, had departed and was not present.

[Robert Braun]

I agree with you to a point. It WAS indeed survival time, and the "British Band" was highly exposed in the middle of a crucial river crossing. Also.. his rear-guard has deserted him. He was surprised, and forced to throw together a patchwork defense... anything to stall for time. If Dodge and Ewing had shown up a half-hour earlier.....

However, I disagree that BH's followers were not up for the fight. Not only did the band muster a mounted charge, the action included a credible defense by more than 200 warriors firing from multiple points and the high ground. Accounts of militia volunteers point to maneuvers by seperate groups of warriors. Nightfall, humid conditions, and a militia command reluctant to press exhausted troops across an unknown morass towards BH's final riverbank defense point was what brought an end to to the action.

As for the "voice" on the hill, the accounts are indeed confusing-- but primarily in the identity of the voice, not in the message. It seems that at least one man, maybe two, in General Henry's command knew enough native language to effect a partial translation... and that message in effect was a plea to be left alone.

I maintain that the evidence does not indicate that the message's intent was surrender. Nor was it BH's intent to surrender, as the actions of his band in the next few days indicated. BH's own autobiography indicates that he attempted surrender only once... on August 1 before Throckmorton's makeshift gunboat Warrior.

[Gene]

A couple of odd things; firstly, where did the number 200 (warriors) come from, I know it's a lttile late (while I'm posting this message (well after 0000 hrs), but I was perusing my BH library here and have'nt run into that number, then I remembered that I took a close up photo of the marker by the battlefield which reads 60 warriors and 700 militia, THEN..I look in ther back of Thayers book and theres a picture (possibly an older one) of the same marker, it reads 1000 "troops" and 50 warriors!

[Robert Braun]

One of the great enduring myths of Wisconsin Heights was that the British Band held off a 800-1000 man militia "army" with 50 warriors. BH's account, taken by itself and uncooberated by any other accounts, certainly gives that impression. And this literal interpretation from BH's viewpoint alone has become the story that has endured in popular imagery from at least the 1970's to the present day.

Authors like Thayer and Nichols alluded to the fact that there simply HAD to be more native casualites than the six fatalities recorded by BH in his autobiography. Indeed, a compilation of militia and later Indian survivor accounts convincingly support this contention.

Without getting into a lengthy dissertation, my analysis and research places the number of warriors in BH's defensive action at Wisconsin Heights at 200-250 men, excluding the defecting rear-guard led by Na-pope.

Likewise, the militia numbers have been drastically overstated in the two markers erected by the Wisconsin Historical Society at WH. Henry and Dodge simply didn't have 700 men on July 21... and they certainly didn't have that number engaged!

[Gene]

OK, I also went to went Black Hawks account, he said that he had 50 warriors engaged?

Just out of curiosity, were some of your resources in Whitney's?
Or some other source? Please feel free to elaborate!

This is one of two major questions that I have about the conflict, the other relates to the true circumstances surrounding Old Mans Creek.

[Robert Braun]

Yes... I provided most of BH's account in the opening post of this thread. Here's the rest:

I concluded to remove our women and children across the Mississippi, that they might return to the Sac nation again. Accordingly, on the next day we commenced moving, with five Winnebagoes acting as our guides, intending to descend the Wisconsin.

Neapope, with a party of twenty, remained in our rear, to watch for the enemy, whilst we were proceeding to the Wisconsin, with our women and children. We arrived, and had commenced crossing over to an island, when we discovered a large body of the enemy coming towards us. We were now compelled to fight, or sacrifice our wives and children to the fury of the whites. I met them with fifty warriors, (having left the balance to assist our women and children in crossing) about a mile from the river, when an attack immediately commenced. I was mounted on a fine horse, and was pleased to see my warriors so brave. I addressed them in a loud voice, telling them to stand their ground and never yield it to the enemy. At this time I was on the rise of a hill, where I wished to form my warriors, that we might have some advantage over the whites. But the enemy succeeded in gaining this point, which compelled us to fall into a deep ravine, from which we continued firing at them and they at us, until it began to grow dark. My horse having been wounded twice during this engagement, and fearing from his loss of blood that he would soon give out, and finding that the enemy would not come near enough to receive our fire, in the dusk of the evening, and knowing that our women and children had had sufficient time to reach the island in the Wisconsin, I ordered my warriors to return, by different routes, and meet me at the Wisconsin, and was astonished to find that the enemy were not disposed to pursue us.

In this skirmish with fifty braves, I defended and accomplished my passage over the Wisconsin, with a loss of only six men, though opposed by a host of mounted militia. I would not have fought there, but to gain time for our women and children to cross to an island.

When BH's account (depending on the edition of his autobiography... the later edition has more non-BH embellishment) is compared to the range of sources available, an interesting story emerges:BH is a cagey character.

Through the translater we see portions of his nature revealed--- smart, proud, politically saavy, vengeful, a little arrogant, and someone who is frankly as biased in his points of view as any of the contemporary BHW writers. Now that's fine... as long as his biases are both recognized and acknowledged. Unfortunately, the overwealming majority of BHW enthusiasts take BH exactly and literally, while in the same breath bemoaning the bias of "white accounts" like John Allen Wakefield.

I was told once that BH's account of WH HAD to be taken literally because it was the only written Indian account of the action. When I started to indicate the problems with accepting accounts unchallenged, I was informed that BH would never lie. When I asked how that statement could be made with such certainty, the person replied, "Well, BH said he didn't lie in one of his speeches."

I suppose the person was referring to BH's surrender speech, in which he was recorded as saying:

Black Hawk is an Indian.

He has done nothing for which an Indian ought to be ashamed. He has fought for his countrymen, the squaws and papooses, against white men, who came, year after year, to cheat them and take away their lands. You know the cause of our making war. It is known to all white men. They ought to be ashamed of it. The white men despise the Indians, and drive them from their homes. But the Indians are not deceitful. The white men speak bad of the Indian, and took at him spitefully. But the Indian does not tell lies; Indians do not steal.

Well... that may or may not be the case. I believe he (either in cahoots with the translator or not) is truthful and revealing in some sections of his account, parses his words in other areas of his account, and sometimes he outright fabricates.

In the case of his account of the battle at Wisconsin Heights, BH appears to be truthful with the portion of the story he tells. However... I believe that BH did not tell his readers the whole story, and did so for probably a variety of reasons.

[Gene]

Thanks for going over that. I agree with your assessment of Black Hawks account (and the narrative of his biography), I noticed B.H.'s method of stretchinging things, I was not sure if some of this was B.H. or the translator or editor?

On your earlier comment about the number of militia there, I wondered about that too, I looked through Whitneys Volunteers and also utilized the Illinois BHW veterans data base, knowing who was there, I tried to come up with a rough number of militia there, I'm not sure what the exact number was, but it could not have been 1000 or even 700. I guess I'm not willing to quote an estimate, because it is unclear due to militiaman being sick, wounded or going home.

[Gene]

Gene said:

Thanks for going over that. I agree with your assessment of Black Hawks account (and the narrative of his biography), I noticed B.H.'s method of stretchinging things, I was not sure if some of this was B.H. or the translator or editor?

On your earlier comment about the number of militia there, I wondered about that too, I looked through Whitneys Volunteers and also utilized the Illinois BHW veterans data base, knowing who was there, I tried to come up with a rough number of militia there, I'm not sure what the exact number was, but it could not have been 1000 or even 700. I guess I'm not willing to quote an estimate, because it is unclear due to militiaman being sick, wounded or going home.

But the only positive way this issue could be totally resolved, would be by doing an archeological dig there. I think theres enough evidence that could act as a guide post, such as the duration of the battle. Given the time factor and rate of fire of the weapons of the time period, if a dig unearthed a large amount of spent lead, (in the right places) we would know what the truth was!

[Robert Braun]

Unfortunately, no one source provides the entire answer.

Archaeology could not deduce for us the numbers of the combatants... only the areas in which combatants fired to/from. And that story is likely incomplete... as Wisconsin Heights (a known battlefield) was for years in private ownership and basically unprotected by the state or its agencies. This allowed who knows what kind of activity on the site, and a real possibility that relics were found and carted off before the DNR took over administration of the property.

I think archaeology would help fill in some of the gaps... clarify some assumptions and offer some new ones. But I don't think that archaerology alone can help us deduce the story of Wisconsin Heights.

r.

[Larry Koschkee]

Bob said: " Na-pope, as many readers will recall, deserted the British Band, along with his warriors. BH claimed eventually all except Na-pope returned."

"It was indeed survival time, and the "British Band" was highly exposed in the middle of a crucial river crossing. Also.. his rear-guard has deserted him. He was surprised, and forced to throw together a patchwork defense... anything to stall for time."

I have a slightly different view of the time frame between Pheasant Branch and the heights of the Wisconsin. In one other instance BH seemed to be referring to his warriors only when he stated he stalled the militia with 50 warriors and only sustained 6 casualties. IMHO Na-pope and a handful of others was his rear guard not the entire "British Band" rear guard. Historical accounts indicate there was frequent Indian rear guard action.

Charles Bracken - "occasionally small parties of Indians were seen on the surrounding eminences; the route was through oak openings from the time of leaving the Fourth Lake."

James Henry - "the enemy began to show itself from the heights on the right and left. The enemy threw back a party of mounted warriors to occupy a position on the left; this movement occasioned a temporary halt, and formation of the line of Battle."

"It was however, soon discovered to be a characteristic stratagem of the Sac Leader, and the Brigade moved forward."

Magoon - "Two hours subsequently [to the Indians shooting Isam Hardin] a view was had of thirty mounted Indians, about eighty rods to the left. One of Henry's regiments was detached to follow them, while the main body continued on the trail. This troop of mounted Indians were making in a southerly direction, while the others were continuing due west."

"Fearing a decoy, Henry's regiment was re-called, and the whole army descended into a valley opening toward the Wisconsin River. The march was continued cautiously, the scouts maintaining a lead of thirty yards."

Henry Dodge - "...they showed themselves frequently on the surrounding hills to divert our attention."

Charles Bracken - "...we advanced rapidly, halting and forming once or twice to meet the enemy, who appeared in some numbers in our front, until we arrived near the Wisconsin bottom..."

Danniel Parkinson - " Upon one occasion, we were thrown into order of battle, but the enemy immediately receded, and a running fire was then kept up almost constantly by our scouts and the rear guard of the Indians, until the main battle was fought."

John Wakefield - "the rear guard of the enemy began by this time (about three o'clock P.M.) to make feint stands; and as the timber stood thick, we did not know but that the whole army of Black Hawk was forming for action; in consequence of which, we got down and formed as often as twice, before we found out that their object was to keep us back until they could gain some strong position to fight from."

"Our front scouts now were determined not to be deceived any more; but the next they came to, they stopped not for their feigned manoeuvre, but pursued them to the main body of the enemy."

Bob said: If Dodge and Ewing had shown up a half-hour earlier...." It is clear, for the most part, the rear guard was effective in buying precious time for the band.

I can not locate my notes presently, but did not Ne-a-pope state that in his rear guard capacity or "hunting" capacity got cut off by the militia, therefore, could not continue his duties? Could be a lame or cowardly excuse, but it should be examined as a possibility. Perhaps he was part of the thirty Indians Magoon said were moving in a southerly direction and got caught between Dodge and Ewing's avant garde and Henry's Regiments.

It is hard for me to believe that Black Hawk was not receiving updated information on the whereabouts of the militia via courier. He was most likely not surprised by the sudden presence of the militia but may well have been surprised that Ne-a-pope and the warriors accompanying him were missing when the main fight occurred.

Larry

[Larry Koschkee]

I found the passage eluded to in the last post whereby Ne-a-pope mayhave been cut off from the battle action. Whitney's Black Hawk War, Vol II, page 1085. Interrogation of Ne-a-pope results. "The morning of the day when the Americans overtook the Sacs at Wisconsin the Prophet said some young men must go and hunt the prisoner went with two parties -- each taking a side of the trail -- they were to join the night camp. The Prophet finding the Americans so close upon them took another direction. The hunting parties went at night to the place where they expected to find the Sac camp, and came upon the American trail -- they then disperesed. The prisoner went to a Winnebago village of the one eyed man ("the Blind") on the waters of Rock river..."

This seems to be a plausible explanation for why Ne-a-pope was not in the battle and also raises a question about the direction the main body was headed after they left their camp at the Four Lakes. My theory has always been - the British Band were to meet friendly Winnebagoes from the "Barribault" river region. (present day Baraboo River) - at its mouth or downstream at Prairie du sac, wereby the Winnebago providing a flotilia of canoes to allow the bulk of the British Band to descend the Wisconsin River.

On the event the militia gained on the band the flotilia was abandoned by the Winnebago because they did not want to be drawn into the fight. Thus, the British band had to resort to building bark canoes.

Larry