Post by Robert Braun on Jul 25, 2002 11:06:00 GMT -5
In another thread, the idea was advanced that Col. Dodge "coerced" General Henry" to disobey Gen. Atkinson's orders to "return without delay" from Fort Winnebago.
In Wakefield’s 1834 recollection of the Black Hawk War, pp. 102-3, he wrote: “GENERALS HENRY AND DODGE had by this time, come to the conclusion to go back around the head of Fox river, to see if they could not fall in with Black Hawk, and stop his passage to the north ; as they supposed he was intending to make his way to the Chippeway nation. General Alexander concluded that it was best to obey General Atkinson's order. He accordingly returned the same way we came, to join General Atkinson; taking with him twelve days' provision. We drew the same number of days' rations. July 15th. We took up the line of march on this day, with General Henry at our head, with the intention to try and see if we could not hunt out Black Hawk.
Regarding this section, editor Frank Stevens offered the following: “Editor's note -- Had Henry concluded to obey Atkinson's orders literally, by returning direct to Koshkonong as soon as the provisions had been drawn, the campaign would have ended in disgrace just as the others had ended. On receipt of news purporting to locate Black Hawk's forces, he called a council of war, at which Alexander declined to disobey orders. While Dodge was in favor of immediate pursuit, he maintained that his forces were so crippled and decimated that the plan was impossible so far as his command was concerned. Thereupon Henry declared he would pursue the enemy if he had to move alone.
In Thomas Ford’s History of Illinois, p. 138-139 we read: “In a council held between Alexander, Henry, and Dodge it was determined to violate orders by marching directly to the enemy, with the hope of taking him by surprise; or at least putting him between them and Gen. Atkinson; thus cutting off his further retreat to the north. Twelve o'clock on the 15th was appointed as the hour to march. Gen. Henry proceeded at once to reorganize his brigade with a view to disencumber himself of his sick and dismounted men, that as little as possible might impede the celerity of his march. Gen. Alexander soon announced that his men were unwilling and had refused to follow; and Major Dodge reported his horses so much disabled by their late march that he could not muster a force worth taking along. Gen. Henry was justly indignant at the insubordination and defection of his companions in arms, and announced his purpose to march in pursuit of the enemy alone if he could prevail upon but fifty men to follow him.
Frank Stevens, in his Black Hawk War, p. 214 quotes from Ford, and expands on that material: “At this place it was ascertained through the Winnebagoes that Black Hawk occupied a strong position at the rapids on Rock River. Henry at once called a council of war, composed of every officer from the rank of captain up, at which he disclosed his information and proposed the question of disobeying Atkinson's orders by pursuing the enemy. Dodge had so exhausted his men and disabled his horses in forcing a march to be in first at Fort Winnebago, that he reported he could not muster a force worth taking along. Alexander reported the unwillingness of his men to disobey orders, leaving Henry alone to make the pursuit, if it were to be made at all. He quietly yet firmly resolved that it should be made. Thereupon he reorganized his brigade by disencumbering his command of the sick, injured and dismounted men, and appointed noon of the 15th for the hour to march. The disaffection of Alexander's men had a demoralizing influence on Fry's Regiment, belonging to Henry's Brigade, which resulted in the signing of a remonstrance, headed by Lieut-Col. Jeremiah Smith, and the presentation of the same to Henry as that officer was ready to march. Fry did not sign this document and had no sympathy with it. On the contrary, he was bitterly opposed to such action. This action emanating from so conspicuous a person and officer as Smith, would, under usual conditions, have frustrated Henry's plans and demoralized his brigade, but he was the man for an emergency, with the will to meet it and the physique to enforce it against ordinary opposition. His genius rose to this occasion and his action ended the Black Hawk war, as it would have been ended long before could he have ordered the volunteer forces as he desired.”
The evidence suggests that, while Dodge argued for a creative "interpretation" or orders and an immediate pursuit, his command (initially) was not in shape to begin the campaign. Henry carried this idea forward, and clearly found merit in the idea. He decided to carry on-- alone if necessary. I submit that he was not coerced into this action, but rather embarked on the plan once his officers signaled a general agreement to take up the pursuit.
In Wakefield’s 1834 recollection of the Black Hawk War, pp. 102-3, he wrote: “GENERALS HENRY AND DODGE had by this time, come to the conclusion to go back around the head of Fox river, to see if they could not fall in with Black Hawk, and stop his passage to the north ; as they supposed he was intending to make his way to the Chippeway nation. General Alexander concluded that it was best to obey General Atkinson's order. He accordingly returned the same way we came, to join General Atkinson; taking with him twelve days' provision. We drew the same number of days' rations. July 15th. We took up the line of march on this day, with General Henry at our head, with the intention to try and see if we could not hunt out Black Hawk.
Regarding this section, editor Frank Stevens offered the following: “Editor's note -- Had Henry concluded to obey Atkinson's orders literally, by returning direct to Koshkonong as soon as the provisions had been drawn, the campaign would have ended in disgrace just as the others had ended. On receipt of news purporting to locate Black Hawk's forces, he called a council of war, at which Alexander declined to disobey orders. While Dodge was in favor of immediate pursuit, he maintained that his forces were so crippled and decimated that the plan was impossible so far as his command was concerned. Thereupon Henry declared he would pursue the enemy if he had to move alone.
In Thomas Ford’s History of Illinois, p. 138-139 we read: “In a council held between Alexander, Henry, and Dodge it was determined to violate orders by marching directly to the enemy, with the hope of taking him by surprise; or at least putting him between them and Gen. Atkinson; thus cutting off his further retreat to the north. Twelve o'clock on the 15th was appointed as the hour to march. Gen. Henry proceeded at once to reorganize his brigade with a view to disencumber himself of his sick and dismounted men, that as little as possible might impede the celerity of his march. Gen. Alexander soon announced that his men were unwilling and had refused to follow; and Major Dodge reported his horses so much disabled by their late march that he could not muster a force worth taking along. Gen. Henry was justly indignant at the insubordination and defection of his companions in arms, and announced his purpose to march in pursuit of the enemy alone if he could prevail upon but fifty men to follow him.
Frank Stevens, in his Black Hawk War, p. 214 quotes from Ford, and expands on that material: “At this place it was ascertained through the Winnebagoes that Black Hawk occupied a strong position at the rapids on Rock River. Henry at once called a council of war, composed of every officer from the rank of captain up, at which he disclosed his information and proposed the question of disobeying Atkinson's orders by pursuing the enemy. Dodge had so exhausted his men and disabled his horses in forcing a march to be in first at Fort Winnebago, that he reported he could not muster a force worth taking along. Alexander reported the unwillingness of his men to disobey orders, leaving Henry alone to make the pursuit, if it were to be made at all. He quietly yet firmly resolved that it should be made. Thereupon he reorganized his brigade by disencumbering his command of the sick, injured and dismounted men, and appointed noon of the 15th for the hour to march. The disaffection of Alexander's men had a demoralizing influence on Fry's Regiment, belonging to Henry's Brigade, which resulted in the signing of a remonstrance, headed by Lieut-Col. Jeremiah Smith, and the presentation of the same to Henry as that officer was ready to march. Fry did not sign this document and had no sympathy with it. On the contrary, he was bitterly opposed to such action. This action emanating from so conspicuous a person and officer as Smith, would, under usual conditions, have frustrated Henry's plans and demoralized his brigade, but he was the man for an emergency, with the will to meet it and the physique to enforce it against ordinary opposition. His genius rose to this occasion and his action ended the Black Hawk war, as it would have been ended long before could he have ordered the volunteer forces as he desired.”
The evidence suggests that, while Dodge argued for a creative "interpretation" or orders and an immediate pursuit, his command (initially) was not in shape to begin the campaign. Henry carried this idea forward, and clearly found merit in the idea. He decided to carry on-- alone if necessary. I submit that he was not coerced into this action, but rather embarked on the plan once his officers signaled a general agreement to take up the pursuit.