Speed and Mobility of the Militia

[Larry Koschkee]

A while back Robert Braun created a thread "Mounted Militia."  I quote Robert: "Only mounted men could keep up with the more mobile "British Band" in 1832."  I have pondered ever since, just exactly what does that statement mean.

Recently, in a thread titled "Lodging on the Campaign", GMC mentioned "speed was a necessity therefore, a need of something eaiser to transport" (tent cloth rather than tents)

Can we draw a comparision between the movement of the Militia and that of the "British Band", whether it be on the march or when mounted soldiers and warriors clash?

[Greg Carter]

Some comparisons can be drawn by examining the circumstances around a few of the fights, and also of course some of the documented quotes. The sequence of events leading up to the Bloody Pond action is a good example. Dodge and his men, located at the fort, caught up with the Kickapoo very rapidly when on horseback. One could easily picture the Kickapoo escaping if the militia would have made strictly a foot pursuit.
GMC

[Larry Koschkee]

GMC,

Can you offer some results of the chase if mounted militia were pursing mounted warriors?  Forgive me for the ignorance as I am more familiar with the conflicts in the Plains Indian Wars.

Do we know what type of mounts the militia utilized?  Were they the barnyard variety?  Also did the regular army mounts have to be of a specific type?

Larry

[Robert Braun]

I guess I'm lost... I am not following the line of questions here.

Larry, you asked what kind of horses upon which the militia and the Regulars were mounted. Here's what we either know, or can infer, from the accounts:

1. The militia, specifically the Michigan Territory militia, either provided their own horses, a resonably simple matter for more well-to-do smelters like Dodge and George Wallace Jones, or had horses issued to them. Procurement of horses was a problem. Dodge sent GWJ to Fort Crawford to obtain 100 horses. The commander there was less than cooperative (didn't wish to take the financial risk) and instead Jones procured about 40 ponies of varying quality from the Winnebago In dian Agent Joseph Street. These plus other horses in the Territory constituted the mounts used by the militia.

2. The Illinois experience may have been similar... and more farm or draught horses my have been avialable there, due to more pronounced farming in Illinois than was allowed in the Michigan Territory. Most of the land that fell under the auspicies of the U. S. Mineral District was prohibitied for purposes of farming.

3. There was no Regular Army cavalry during this time period. Hence the Infantry and Artillery companies deployed for the campaign were all on foot. Speed and mobility would have to come from the mounted militia.

Clearly, more experienced leaders like Dodge recognized the need to increase the Army's speed and mobility if they were ever going to catch the British Band. Proof of this is the elusive campaign waged by Black Hawk as Atkinson ponderously plodded north into present-day Wisconsin in the hope opf picking up the trail. Burdened with supply carts and foot soldiers, the column was simply not able to move as fast of the British Band... a factor which explains in no small way BH's succes in eluding the Army for many weeks.

Add to this Dodge's decision to disencumber the column of his squadron and the brigade of General Henry at the Rock River Rapids once the trail WAS found. The decision to leave five supply wagons, most of the food, other impedimentia, and most of the tent-cloths proved to be an important factor that lead to the successful pursuit of the band to Wisconsin Heights.

Finally, analysis of Dodge's orders and communications indciated that the only practical defense of the Mineral District could only be effected by a mounted force. Indeed, with the ranger companies of Stephenson and Craig, along with Dodge's squadron, the modest mounted forces in the District were able to mount a credible, elastic response force. Atkinson quickly recognized these benefits after Wisconsin Heights, when Dodge's squadron was typically in the fore of the advancing Army from that point on.

[Larry Koschkee]

Bob, just trying to get a sense of the role the horse played in this conflict.  I am a student of and fascinated by the "The Horse Soldiers" and their mounts on the North American Continent.   For several years I outfitted my horse with Thorton Gimsley's pre-Civil horse equipment (circa 1850-1855), second Daniel Campbell's saddle (circa 1856-1858 and subsequently Captain George McCellan's saddle with trappings of the 1872 -1880 Plains Indian Warfare.

I concur that the best way to protect or defend the Mining District against small, mobile war parties was from the back of a horse, however to suggest that the infantry could not have been effective on the offensive in the BHW, I do not agree.

If General Atkinson's infantry been had able to get on the trail of Black Hawks main body immediately after Stillman's Run there should not have been any reason that they could not have dogged the Band into submission.  It was Gen. Atkinson's imcompetence that put Black Hawk's main body of people out of reach.  As it was, Black Hawk was able to send out war parties from the main body to harass, maim, kill and plunder because for weeks he did not have to protect the main body from the Army.

It would not have been any great feat to catch Black Hawk's main body on a warm or hot trail, because after all it was predominately made up of old men, women and children lacking food and on foot carrying all the belongings of a village with them.  It would have been a pathetic excuse for an infantry not to keep up.

How effective in battle were the Indians on horseback? Perhaps Captain Henry Smith of General Atkinson's Brigade summed it up best when speaking of Black Hawks combined force.  "...About four hundred and fifty of this force were mounted, and it is but justice to say they were very efficient cavalry on hardy and generally well trained horses; they never came into contact with our militia, both mounted, that the Indians did not come off victors, whatever might be their inferiority in numbers."

[Robert Braun]

Clearly, the Regular Infantry was effective once the battle was joined (per the The Battle of Mississippi, August 2, 1832) but to read Captain Smith's own account of the campaign is to understand the lack of confidence experienced by the infantry in its inability to bring battle onto the British Band.

For the record, Smith was a Regular Army officer. As such, his account is heavily weighted (naturally) in favor of the Regular Army involvement. Shortly after his account was published in 1833, it came under attack by several pro-militia commentators for failing to give the militia its due, generally by Smith simply omitting pertinent facts or failing to fully explain others, an example being the victory at Wisconsin Heights.

The disdain held by the Regulars for militia is well-documented. From Smith's account, to St. George Crook, to Jeff Davis, their accounts are replete with thinly disguised harumphing over the militia generally and militia conduct during the war. I submit this disdain may be due less to the traditional rivalry felt between the Regular service and state militia than it is to conceal the lackluster contributions of the Regular Army in 1832. In fairness, I note that Smith's account is perhaps more balanced of those offered by his professional collegues.

I submit that Infantry alone could not have subdued the British Band, even if they had spotted the trail.

For one, BH probably would have employed the mounted warriors, so lauded by Captain Smith, in a series of hit and run and delay tactics similar to that seen on the march to Wisconsin Heights. BH historically favored the surprise and shock of a small mounted force... something Regular Infantry alone would have been unable to return in kind. Finally, the Regulars traveled with numerous supply wagons... which would require road (or at least trail) construction wide enough to admit passage of the wagons and horses pulling them,  through large tracts of wilderness in order to keep up. The success of the Regulars alone would not have been the fait accompli you seem to suggest... because BH simply would not have laid down and offerred his band for destruction.

I disagree with your assessment that the Britsh Band was "predominatly" made up of women, children and elderly. No one clearly knows for sure the total force deployed by BH across the Mississippi River in April. However, scholars writing decades ago generally agree that 1,000 to 1,200 people, at least half well armed, mounted warriors, comprised the band. These numbers constantly fluctuated as Winnebago, Kickapoo and Potthingy omie, and Sauk and Fox, drifted into and out of support for BH and the "cause." That his own people began deserting him is supported by the numbers seen towards the end of the campaign, and their own reaction in the August 1, 1832 evening council in which Black Hawk argued for not crossing the Mississippi and evading further north.

Captain Henry's glowing tribute nothwithstanding, BH's warriors, mounted or not, put up a gallant but losing effort against the forces arrayed against them. Except for "Stillman's Run" and attacks against isolated settlements, BH suffered tactical defeats at every action in which he was engaged. These facts attest to the effectiveness of the British Band's mounted warriors--and the the effectiveness of his tactical leadership.

I am curious to learn something. Since you are willing to accept Captain Henry's assessment of BH's mounted warriors, are you likewise willing to accept his supportive and generally compassionate review of Gen. Atkinson's conduct of the campaign?

r.

[Larry Koschkee]

Second Lieut. R. H. Magoon gave an account of speed and distance traveled in his memoirs published in the History of Grant County, 1881, p 428.

From the account I gleaned information about a column of volunteers commanded by Col. Dodge that started a march from Gratiot's Grove "to reclaim and inter the bodies of St. Vrain and others who had fallen at Plum River."

From the Plum River they went to Dixon's Ferry, escorted General Brady to Ottawa, Il, then returned to Gratiot's Grove via Kellogg's Grove.

Lieut. Magoon stated "Arriving at Gratiot's Grove, Col. Dodge informed the volunteers that they had covered two hundred miles in five days, thus averaging forty miles a day."

[Mike Thorson]

Some great material you are posting here Larry, thanks!

[Larry Koschkee]

In research of the BHW I am most intrigued with Joseph Dickson's mounted spy company under the command of Col. Dodge, sweeping and reconnoitering the area in front of the army... Second would be the "Express" or "Dispatch" riders. This was dangerous and exhilarating business.

Frederick Hollman's autobiography published in the Grant County News, Platteville, WI, Dec 10, 1920 through Feb 4, 1921 gives a snapshot of a express ride for Col. Dodge.

The alarm was out that Black Hawk had crossed over the Mississippi River into Illinois. Dodge and Gratiot had just concluded a successful council with the Winnebago at the Blue Mounds in May 28, 1832, essentialy freezing there position on the side of the U. S. From the Blue Mounds Dodge sent messengers to General Atkinson, who was coming up the Rock River Valley in Illinois, asking for orders and instructions in cooperation with his forces.

While waiting at Fort Hamilton, word came that the killing of two men near Sinsinawa Mound had put the people of Platteville and vicinity in flight towards Galena.
Capt. John Rountree of Platteville resigned his commission to Col. Dodge because of injuries. Rountree was, thereupon, directed to go to Galena to deliver an order from Dodge to John Atchison, "to furnish sufficient arms, ammunition and provisions to those who were in Fort Dodge at Platteville, as they should stand in need." Then Dodge sent Frederick Hollman to Platteville to assure the people of his protection.

Hollman says Dodge addressed him as follows:
"Mr. Hollman it has been reported to me that the settlers at Platteville, and in that vicinity are about to break up, and leave for other localities which are considered more safe. This must be prevented, I have selected you to go to Platteville, in order that this stampede of the inhabitants may be stopped. Tell them for me that in as much as they have a strong blockhouse that I want them to stay and defend it, and in order that they may be able to do so, I have ordered that provisions, arms and ammunition in sufficient quantities be furnished them. In addition to this I will keep watch over their welfare, and if danger should threaten them, I shall endeavor to protect them.

Here is your commission as commissary of subsistance. You will retain your position in the company (Rountree's then Dickson's) to which you belong, but will be detailed to act as I now instruct you to. You must start for Platteville by daylight. The distance is about fifty miles, you have a good horse. Ride hard. If you kill your horse, get another one and go forward. By all means get to Fort Dodge by tomorrow evening. Take as straight a course as possible. You will be able to see the Platte Mounds. Keep near them, but to the left of them. Avoid all thickets, and keep in the open prairie. If you see Indians at a distance and you can reach timber take shelter there in. Select as large a tree as possible to protect your person, and in case you cn reach no tree, take your position behind your horse. See that your carbine is well loaded. Be off early, and act with the greatest caution.

A young man presented me with a pistol, remarking at the time that it was loaded, and that I might stand in need of it. At four o'clock in the morning, after bidding "goodbye" to Doctor Davidson, and other friends, I took my departure for Platteville. The weather was pleasant and I rode forward rapidly. By two o' clock in the afternoon my horse showed signs of great fatigue, and being near a spot where water and grass was abundant, I thought I would rest him, and permit him to graze. Knowing that he would not leave me, I slipped the bridle from his head and turned him loose. I now partook of some food which I had for the occasion, and then threw myself upon the grass to rest. In a moment I was sound asleep. This was near the spot where Belmon Station now stands."

Hollman did not have to kill his horse or had any encounters with Indians... "When I arrived at Platteville, I met with a joyous reception. The excitement had already somehwat subsided, as the news that the Winnebagoes were friendly had already reached the inhabitants."

Larry K

[Larry Koschkee]

William R. Smith's The History of Wisconsin, 1854, page 229 quoted Capt. James B. Estes as making a ninety mile express ride for Col. Dodge from their encampment at "Wisconsin Heights" to Prairie du Chien, WI., departing the morning of July 22nd and arriving at noon on the 23rd. There was a sense of urgency in this ride to be sure. Dodge's letter was directed to Capt. Gustavus Loomis. Loomis was in command of Fort Crawford in the absence of Col. Zachary Taylor.

If you could place a field piece immediately on the Quisconsin, that would command the river, you might prevent their escape by water.

At first glance this was astounding speed for an express dispatch.... ninety miles in 24 to 32 hours. It would have to take into account of at least one remount, but there was no mention of that. When I started to peel back this account, it was clear that Estes did not arrive at Prairie du Chien until noon on the 25th.

Loomis to Dodge letter dated the 25th. Sir/ I recd. your letter of the 22d. Inst. by Capt. Estes... Whitney, BHW, Vol II, Part II, p 880 and 900... A letter from Loomis to Henry Atkinson Sir/ I recieved General Dodge letter of 22d. Inst. on the 25th. by Captain Estes, which I answered the same day....

So now instead of a fast ride... what took Capt. Estes so long. Based on the velocity information in this thread he should have at least averaged 40 to 50 miles per day on a good mount and arrived in about a two day hard ride.

Typical cross-country movement for a horse in reasonable condition will average 2 mph in a natural walk; 3 to 3.5 mph in a moderate walk; 5 mph at a trot; 7 mph at a canter and 12 mph at a gallop.

Captain Estes must have encountered some difficulties in the trip.

BTW did you ever ponder why a Indian mounted on a typical Indian pony or horse in good condition, unshod, could keep up with or ahead of, which ever the case, a white man on a shod horse in good condition??

[Robert Braun]

I suspect, without looking any deeper into the subject than what has been presented here, that factors came into play which may well have delayed Estes. Some other questions come to my mind... for example:

1. June 25 appears to be the date the express was received. Does this mean this was the date Estes arrived in PDC, or the date Loomis finally took the communication in hand?

2. To add to Larry's interesting analysis of distances theoretically able to be covered on horseback, Dodge was able to push his squadron 60 miles in a single leg to Fort Winnebago (he arrived with men and horses exhausted.) The terrain on the east side of the Wisconsin varies-- in some cases significantly-- from the terrain on the west side of the river. Were the intervening rivers, streams, and general terrain a factor in the time Estes took to arrive at PDC?

3. Having hiked and travelled in western Wisconsin, terrain and land features can be confusing. It's also more rugged---broken with ridges and semi- mountainous terrain. 90 miles as the proverbial crow flies can mean much more in terms of actual miles tallied in the "ups and downs" of western Wisconsin. Did Estes get lost? Or was he trying to evade Indian patrols from Balck Hawk's band, which he knew were then located somewhere west of the Wisconsin River?

4. Form my personal experience, a horse at a walk appears to be able to cover the same distance as a semi-fit human with a 30 pound load over uneven terrain. A horse at a moderate walk appears to be able to cover the same distance as a semi-fit human with a 10 pound load over fairly even terrain. Using these facts, compared to the given "90 miles" distance, in theory, a reasonably physically fit Estes could have walked to PDC in about three days (3 miles per hour x 10 hours/day x 30 days = 90 miles.) If he handed his message to Loomis at Fort Crawford on the morning of the 25th, it would seem that it indeed took him about three days! But why?


Regarding Larry's last query...

BTW did you ever ponder why a Indian mounted on a typical Indian pony or horse in good condition, unshod, could keep up with or ahead of, which ever the case, a white man on a shod horse in good condition??

...I would say that, given the context of the Black Hawk War, the ability for the natives to keep at least a day or two distance from the Regulars and militia is an important part of the puzzle. Having a "head start" allowed Black Hawk to use time and distance to his advantage.

[Mike Thorson]

Larry said:

BTW did you ever ponder why a Indian mounted on a typical Indian pony or horse in good condition, unshod, could keep up with or ahead of, which ever the case, a white man on a shod horse in good condition??

Being shod or unshod wouldn't make any difference in regards to speed.

Depending on the nature of the ground and how it is kept etc., it might make a difference regarding soundness over the long term.

[Larry Koschkee]

Bob... Responding to your questions--- good questions.

1) Based on the urgency and importance of the dispatch
Estes was carrying I would have expected Loomis to receive the expressman immediately no matter what hour of the day it was and take immediate action on Dodge's recommendations and also send off a dispatch to Atkinson appraising him without delay.

2 & 3) The greater question here is... what route did Estes take to Prairie du Chien, north or south of the Wisconsin River? My sense is he would have travelled the southern route for the following reasons:

A) It was a known fact that the enemy had crossed over to the northside of the river. It was an unknown fact if there were Indian patrols on the south side.

B) Estes was engaged in mining in Iowa County before the BHW broke out therefore should have been at least remotely familiar with territory south of the Wisconsin.

C) There were no white settlers or miners north of the Wisconsin except at Prairie du Chien. By travelling south from the battlefield, although swampy and rugged terrain for some 25 miles, he could reach the track that later was named Military Ridge Road, thence west through open country made up of prairie and oak savanna. Historical accounts cite there were abundant springs on either side of this east/west divide and you could travel with ease.

D) There was an opportunity for resupply of food and remounts along this route at Brigham's at Mound Fort, Parish"s at Wingville and Jean Brunet's ferry on the Wisconsin.

4) Your mathematical presentation of a man on foot is excellent and it supports the suspicion that Estes may have encountered difficulties.

[Larry Koschkee]

Bob and Mike... In response to your comments on the condition of shod or unshod horses here are some comments of my own...

First of all Bob's comment...I would say that, given the context of the BHW, the ability for the natives to keep at least a day or two distance from the Regulars and militia is an important part of the puzzle. It is my opinion that Bob's statement speaks to the possibility of the Indians use of efficient intelligence and would like to advance this dialogue in a seperate thread.

Mike's comments 1) Being shod or unshod wouldn/t make any difference in regards to speed... 2) depending on the nature of the ground and how it is kept etc., it might make a difference regarding soundness over the long term.. I agree on the first statement and would be in agreement with the second comment if Mike was suggesting the shod horse could have problems with being sound, but I think Mike is suggesting just the opposite. Let me explain.

Equine research has shown that there is no significant difference in shod or unshod light horse performance over most natural ground surfaces but more problems can develope in unshod horses when the animals are subjected, for extended periods of time, to hard surfaces such as black top, concrete or compacted stone aggregate such as "gravel" surfaces. Problems are not with hoof wear but with concussion on impact with the hard surface.

Horses have been shod since the days of the Romans and for centuries it was primarily a European tradition, a tradition that was carried out in North America. The ancestors of the horses that were brought to America from this region were not bred for healthy, strong hooves but for other reasons such as gait, confirmation, size, color, etc.. There was no conscientous attempt to breed well hooved horses with others of the same trait. Generation after generation of horses were simply shod without regard to hoof strength. When you drive nails into the hoof wall it weakens it.

By the time the BHW broke out the horse flesch in the lead region was made up principally of Euro-American Colonial/Plantation type horses with a lot of emphasis in Thoroghbred blood lines. What horses the Federal Regulars rode were of this type also. Were these good horses? Yes, they were, but for the most part they did not fend for themselves. Hay and grain were harvested for them, their hooves were trimmed and shod, they were brushed and groomed and many cases they were stabled.

Now contrast that with mounts of the North American Indian. Before the Europeans arrived on our shores their horses were descendants of Spanish Colonial breeds such as Barbs and Andalusian. These horses were re-introduced by the 16th century Spanish explorers such as De Soto and Coronado. As a result of these explorations, feral horses or "Mustangs" became the foundation sires and mares of the North American Indian. For centuries on this continent they fended for themselves, competing with ungulates for forage, evading predators and humans. There was a harsh natural selection that took place. The smartest and fittest survived. That could mean traits of sound legs, tough hooves and endurance passed on to their offspring.

There is no evidence of consicentous breeding of horses by Indians for gait, confirmation or size, but they did select breeding for colored horses. The best example of this is the well known Appalosa horses of the Wallowa Nez Perce. Not only does this horse display unique colors and patterns but had outstanding toughness and endurance. We can see that in 1877, 1100 mile epic flight from their homelands while pursued by U. S. Army Generals, Howard, Sturgis and Miles The flight started in Oregon continuing on into portions of Idaho, Wyoming and finally ending about 40 miles south of Canada in Montana.

On the 100th anniversary of the Nez Perce flight I rode the last 340 miles of that trail starting at the Clark's Fork of the Yellowstone River on the Wyoming/Montana Border and finished at the Bear Paw Mountains battle/surrender site. My 9 year old, 16 hands high quarter horse/saddlebred cross mount, Ike made the trip in 8 days. He was outfitted in a George McCellan cavalry saddle with accouterments and our impression was the 1872-1880 Plains Indian Wars. He held up well and only threw one horseshoe. Most of the horses in the group of 27 did well only six had to drop out.

The tribes of Wisconsin and Illinois at the time of Euro-American settlement utilized horses modestly compared to the great horse culture tribes of the plains. Historic accounts show they conducted trips into what is now called southwestern United States, Kansas and Nebraska to trade or barter for horses. Many times these trips coincided with buffalo hunts.

In a fight or chase and all things being equal in a horse's condition I would choose a "Mustang" type unshod horse over a Euro-American mount that is shod. If that shod horse throws a shoe and it can not be replaced right away it would be like a flat tire on a motor vehichle.... you have got problems.

To be continued...

Larry K

[Larry Koschkee]

I would like to ask for the moderators of this board to indulge me for taking this thread out on a branch of this thread topic. Hope you do not saw it off behind me...

It is important to make the distinction between horses used by the militia and Indians. Bob Braun got me pondering this topic almost a year in his post in this thread of April 25th., 2002.. Quote Clearly, more experienced leaders like Dodge recognized the need to increase the Army's speed and mobility if they were ever going to catch the British Band. This was a pivotal point in U. S. Military history. Not only did the Army need to supply a mounted force to compete with the Indians they needed to start thinking about quality of horses to be sent in the field.

Col. Henry Dodge was appointed Major of the original battalion of mounted rangers by President Andrew Jackson and later selected him to organize and command the U.S. Regiment of Dragoons that was authorized by the U. S. Congress, March 2, 1833.

The shock of a massed charge by gun-wielding horseman was a powerful psychological and deadly military weapon.

A dotted line connected the 1st Squadron of the 1st United States Cavalry Regiment to the BHW in their regimental flag and motto. Blackhawk icon on the flag and Animo Et Fide (Courageous and Faithful)

The success of the mounted militia in the BHW definately changed the way the U. S. Army conducted campaigns in the frontier.

I have not done any extensive research yet, regarding when the Army Quartermasters started issuing specifications for remounts. Here is an exampe of my reenactment era... 1872-1880. This was the report of the quartermaster general for 1876-1877, included in the annual Secretary of War's report Messages and Documents, 1876-1877, pgs. 272, contains the specifications for issue to the cavalry regiments: Calvary Horses: To be geldings, of hardy colors, sound in all particulars, in good condition, well broken to the saddle, from 15 to 16 hands high, not less than 5 nor more than 9 years old, and suitable in every respect for cavalry service.
Whenever it becomes necessary to purchase the half-breed horses of California or Southern Texas, the standard of height may be reduced to not less than 14 1/2 hands.

hardy colors, were typically solid color, bays, sorrels and blacks. Much of the early stock had mixtures of Morgan, American Saddlebred and Thoroghbred blood lines. Other characteristics the Army looked for were a good height ratio between the loins and the withers for saddle placement, ample heart girth (which usually suggests good lung capacity), dark colored hooves and no light colored "sock" patterns on their legs. (white or light covered "socks" with light colored hoof walls usually meant a potential for hoof problems.)

My caveat in comparing horses is there are always exceptions and are plenty anectdotal accounts to prove a theory wrong. And of course I have my own.

In 1966 I rescued a 2 1/2 year colt from certain death. I was hunting antelope on a ranch located at the edge of the South Dakota Badlands. It was the fall of the year and the rancher's family were bringing horses off the range to seperate for breeding stock or put up for sell. The horses were grade horses with no registered pedigrees. Several horse buyers were there and purchased all but three, two old brood mares past their prime and a Bay colt with a Roman nose and the feet of a plow horse. The three were to be sold to a fox farm in western Minnesota. $75.00 and vet's fees for shots and papers made me the owner of the colt. The vet told me "you have got yourself one tough colt there son. I almost broke the needles on his tough hide to get him vaccainated." I queried the vet about his notion of his breeding. "Looks to me like a mustang/plow horse cross... one of them jumped the fence."

I named the colt Pompey because of his Roman nose and broke him to harness and saddle. He filled out to just under 16 hands high. You could not ride him with a cavalry saddle because of his high. wide withers so did not do any reneactment with him. He had a bone jarring trot, canter and gallop but could he walk... a fast walk for miles and miles. He became my favorite trail horse and could out distance any other horse on the trail whether we were in the flatlands or mountains.. His hoof walls were very tough and was difficult to get nails into them. I only shod his front feet if we were going to ride in the mountains.

The only bad habit he had was he did not like dogs or coyotes and would chase them whenever possible. He died of a heart attack in 1991... never had a health problem all those years.. always "sound as a dollar." He was born, by most equine standards, a ugly horse of mustang origin but that proved to be only skin deep.

That mustang taught me more than I taught him and gave me a deep respect for non-registered horses..

Larry K.